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Abstract 
The covered warrants market plays an important role in Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. Since the stock options were introduced in September 1995, there has been 
doubt that the covered warrants market would be adversely affected. To test the 
impact of the introduction of stock options on the underlying covered warrants 
market, we examined changes of micro-structural variables of 22 covered warrants 
using data from May 1995 to February 1996. 
The retum, turnover and bid-ask spread of warrants are examined by simple t-
test and F-test. Specifically, we adopt the spread decomposition model suggested by 
Raymond Chiang (1986) to explore reasons for possible changes. Besides, the 
relations between changes and individual warrant's characteristics, like issuer, 
maturity date and price status, are studied. 
We find that the introduction of stock options does not have significant impact 
on the underlying covered warrants market as a whole. However, the impacts on each 
individual warrant are inconsistent. The introduction of stock options could either 
increase, decrease or have no influence on the volatility, liquidity and bid-ask spread. 
We attribute the divergent changing patterns of the covered warrants to the 
following factors: the composition of retail and institutional investors in the warrants 
market; the mixture of different trading activities in the warrants market; and the 
divergent changes of the underlying stocks in response to the stock options 
introduction. 
Suggestions for further research and implications of our findings to the 
development of Hong Kong stock market are also presented. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Hong Kong has the second most active warrants market in Asia, only next to 
that of Japan. Warrants market plays an important role in Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. Traditionally, warrant turnover in Hong Kong is about 10% of the cash 
market. Sometimes it could hit as high as 25% like in the middle of 1994. Within the 
warrant's domain, covered warrant, which is essentially a long term stock option, is of 
special interest to both retail and institutional investors. As a percentage of total 
warrant turnover, covered warrants account for 70%. 
Covered warrant's attraction is in its gearing, which enable investors to 
capture unlimited upside potential but with limited downside losses. Trading in 
warrants costs significantly less than trading of their underlying assets. These unique 
features of covered warrants make them popular since 1990 in a bull market 
sentiment. 
However, the covered warrants are facing direct competition from the stock 
options which have been introduced in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange since 
September 8, 1995. As an equity derivative, the stock option is a more standardized 
instrument than the covered warrant. Together with more comprehensive regulation 
and sophisticated market making system, it is assumed that some investments could 
be diverted from the covered warrants market to the stock options market. Based on 
the experience from the US market, some experts even predict a gradual extinction of 
the covered warrants market in Hong Kong. 
Contrary to this prediction, dealers in the covered warrants market do not 
report an apparent decrease of turnover, although the spreads are generally thinner 
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after the introduction of stock options. The Hong Kong market demonstrates again 
some characteristics that are different from that of US market. It is thus very much 
worth of exploring reasons underlying these characteristics. 
Besides, the study of the covered warrants market is also of practical 
importance. Currently, the Stock Exchange is striving to enhance the role of Hong 
Kong as a regional financial center. To make the market more complete by 
introducing new derivative instruments in the market is one of the major works of the 
Stock Exchange. However, several recent notorious events related derivatives, like 
Baring Accident, lead to concerns about derivatives from the business community. It 
is necessary for the Stock Exchange to well regulate the market so as to ensure that 
both efficiency and structure of the stock market are improved after the introduction 
of new derivatives. 
The Stock Exchange is going to introduce stock options on other ten 
companies this year. The findings from this study could be helpful for the Stock 
Exchange when they consider new stock options listings, and useful for practitioners 
when new stock options are to be introduced later this year. 
Possibly due to inactive trading of warrants in most markets, there is no 
literature studying the issue of impact of option introduction on the underlying 
warrants. Nevertheless, the literature provides a good theoretical framework for 
understanding the situation of the covered warrants market. Based on this knowledge 
and intensive information survey about the covered warrants market in Hong Kong, 
we draw assumptions about impacts of stock options introduction on the underlying 
covered warrants market. These assumptions are then tested with statistical methods� 
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II. WARRANT AND COVERED WARRANT 
Warrant is an instrument issued to investors or shareholders that entitles the 
holder to buy an ordinary share in that company at a fixed price within a preset period. 
Warrant pays no dividend, holds no voting right and has no claim on assets in 
liquidation unless it is converted. If the warrant is not converted or traded to a third 
party at the time of maturity, the investor will lose all ofhis outlay. 
There are two main types of warrant listed on the SEHK: equity warrants and 
derivative warrants. The equity warrant refers to warrants issued by a listed company 
on the underlying stocks. The warrant in this case is a corporate financing tool used by 
the company to raise cash in a relatively steady stream over time. 
The term "derivative warrant" describes warrant that is issued by a third party 
and not by the listed company itself, or a warrant on any other asset, such as an index, 
currency, or portfolio of equities. The derivative warrant may be exercised into cash 
or securities. The issuer of the derivative warrant may or may not actually hold the 
underlying securities to meet its exercise obligations. If the issuer does hold the 
underlying securities, or entitled to those securities, the warrant is known as "covered 
warrant". 
The performance of the obligation of the covered warrant issuer is secured by 
the deposit of the underlying securities or assets with an independent trustee, 
custodian or depository who holds the securities or assets for the benefit ofthe holders 
of the covered warrants. In Hong Kong, the Stock Exchange strictly regulates the 
qualification of potential issuers, which helps minimize the credit risk faced by 
warrant investors. 
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Another way to "cover" the warrant is to apply dynamic hedging. This 
produces what is known as a synthetic warrant. The objective is to minimize the costs 
of hedging while maximizing profits. Considerable risk management technology is 
needed in this case to prevent the issuer from losing money if share price rises to 
prompt exercise of the warrants. 
Covered warrant provides company a cheap way of financing. What warrant 
issuers are doing is selling volatility. In the past, a company could only be able to sell 
volatility risk in currencies or interest rate through certain currency or interest rate 
related derivatives pinned on to a loan. The covered warrant allows a company to sell 
volatility risk in equities. Because the volatility is far greater in equities, the potential 
for debt reduction is far greater. 
When warrant approaches its maturity date, it becomes less volatile and the 
premium tends to drop. Few holders of covered warrants will hold them until 
conversion. Rather they are likely to trade them in the secondary market to make 
money. Their exercises are normally left to specialist investors at the end of the 
warrant's life. 
The major issuers of covered warrants in Hong Kong are foreign banks and 
financial firms. The issuer's cut comes from issuing the covered warrant at a 
premium. Warrant thrives on volatility. The issuers usually choose a time when the 
investing public is optimistic about the stock market in general and the shares of 
concem in particular, while they are bearish on future market. 
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III. HONG KONG WARRANTS MARKET 
3,1 Brief review 
Warrant has been in existence since 1911 and mainly flourished during bull 
markets. The first warrant in Hong Kong was listed in 1973. But the warrant market 
of Hong Kong exploded into life only in the post-1987-crash era, with companies 
rushing to raise money by issuing warrants. In January 1987, there were only 25 
warrant issues. By the end of 1992, the figure had rocketed to more than 200. 
Figure 1 Number ofWarrants Issues in Hong Kong from 1986 -1992 
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Source: Scott, R.H., Manual of the security industry, the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited, 
1992, p.354 
Hong Kong is one of the most liquid warrant markets in the world. In Asia, 
Hong Kong warrant market is only next to the Japanese warrant market. A 
comparison ofwarrants markets in south Asia is shown in the following chart: 
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Figure 2: Asian Warrant Turnover 
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Figure 3 Total capitalization of Hong Kong Warrant Market 
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Over years from 1989 to 1993, the Hong Kong warrants market experienced a 
steady growth as shown in figure 3. However, since 1994, the warrant market started 
to decline. In 1995, right before the introduction of stock options, the warrants market 
was just of a capitalization level similar to that of seven years ago. 
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3-2 The covered warrants market 
Covered warrants came on to the Hong Kong market in early 1990s. The first 
covered warrant was issued by Salomon Brothers, on the Hongkong Telecom stock in 
1990. The most famous covered warrant issue in Hong Kong was in March 1990. The 
issue was part of a friendly acquisition by China International Investment Corp. 
(CITIC) of 20% stake in Hongkong Telecom. The covered warrant issue, devised by 
Barclays de Zoete Wedd (BZW) and Morgan Stanley, significantly reduced CITIC's 
cost ofborrowing. 
Over the last two years the derivative warrant market in Hong Kong has 
witnessed further development with Hong Kong continuing to have the most active 
derivative warrant market in South Asia. During the period from Jan. 1, 1993 to Oct. 
31, 1995, the total number of derivative warrants which have been listed on the 
Exchange is 120, comprising 106 derivative warrants on shares, 8 on currencies, 3 on 
gold, 2 on indices and 1 on base metals? 
Figure 4: Hong Kong Covered Warrants Issues 
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1 Source: Consultation Paper in Relation to Derivative Warrants, the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, Nov 1995 
p.l , , 
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There are mainly three types of covered warrant in Hong Kong: call warrant, 
put warrant, as well as call spread warrant. For some companies, both call warrants 
and put warrants are available, while others may only have, most probably’ a call 
warrant. All types of covered warrant are typically American style, which means they 
can be exercised at any time before the maturity date of the warrant. The Stock 
Exchange regulates that covered warrant's life cannot be less than one year or longer 
than five years. 
Some people criticize that covered warrant issuance hinders the ability of 
controlling shareholders to raise fund. Therefore, the Stock Exchange regulates that 
covered warrant issues can never be greater than 20% of the issued share capital of the 
target company. This regulation limits the depth and breadth of the covered warrants 
market to certain extent. 
One feature particular to Hong Kong is the substantial involvement of ordinary 
retail investors in derivative warrants market. According to the "Retail Investor 
Survey 1994" conducted by the Stock Exchange, in October 1994, there were 
approximately 420,000 stock investors, accounting 10 percent of the Hong Kong adult 
population (aged 21 or above). It also reported that around three percent of Hong 
Kong adult population held investment in warrants. In other words, there are about 
126,000 individuals trading in the warrants market^. In general, warrant market 
attracts the fifth largest number of investors (3%)^ Most individual investors invest in 
the warrants market through the warrants funds. 
2 Source: Consultation Paper in Relation to Derivative Warrants, the Stock Exchange ofHong Kong, Nov 1995 
p . 7 , ’ 
the number is 23% for fixed deposite accounts, 17% for foreign currency savings account, 9% for stocks and 5% 
for real estate not for self-residence. 
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3.3 Attraction of Warrants 
Risk management vehicle: Warrants allow investors to undertake risk 
management strategies not available to them before. Many institutions use warrant for 
hedging purposes. They also use warrants to maximize their exposure to a given 
investment target while at the same time reducing currency exposure, since they will 
not have to pay the same amount as they would if investing in the ordinary shares. 
Gearing effect: The principal advantage of warrants over ordinary shares is 
that they offer the potential for much larger gains in rising markets. Warrants 
concentrate exclusively on capital gain, leading on occasions to some spectacular 
profits. During bull market or at other times of rising prices, even the most speculative 
forms of direct investment in equities cannot match the sort of retums commonly 
available to warrants holders. Although warrant is notoriously volatile, Hong Kong 
investors enjoy their apparent high-risk, high-reward characteristic at an outlay less 
than that associated with buying the ordinary share. The high level of risk attached to 
a warrant is matched by a good chance of appreciation: warrants are seen as the 
ultimate get-rich-quick investment. 
Fund raising instrument: Warrant is used to ensure the issuance company to 
raise capital in a pre-specified time period. Its attraction is that, as well as generating 
interest in the initial issue, upon exercising the warrants into shares on their maturity 
date, additional money flows into the company. Increasing interest in warrant is also 
due to the wider employment of warrants as sweetener to new share issues during 
flotation. 
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Ownership control instrument: Issuing warrant is also one of the methods 
for controlling shareholders to safeguard their controlling power, and at the same time 
reap windfall gains. This happens when the market price of the company's stock 
continues to rise and is at a high level. Selling their shares out might undermine their 
controlling power. Nevertheless, with warrants already issued, they can sell the shares 
out in the open market and buy back the equal number of shares by exercising their 
warrant provided that the exercise price is substantially lower than the current market 
price of the share.^ Warrants blur the relative positions of shareholders. The majority, 
or controlling shareholders can use less funds to maintain their power. If they are 
threatened with a takeover, they simply exercise the warrants, converting them back to 
shares, 
Underpriced warrants: Hong Kong warrants, because of political factors, 
tend to be undervalued. However, in view of fast growing economy in China and Asia 
Pacific region, there could be far more demand of warrants in the future when more 
funds flow into the market. With potential price increases, warrants are still very 
attractive to Hong Kong investors. 
Availability of professional service: 11 warrant funds were approved by 
SFC in November 1989. Warrant funds allow investors to invest without having to 
monitor the complex market themselves. Besides, the local public media provides a 
coverage of all listed warrants in the Stock Exchange, keeping investors relatively 
informed of the market situation. 
4 Manual o fThe Hong Kong Securities Industry, The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, 1994, p. 72-74 
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IV. STOCK OPTIONS 
The first stock option was introduced in the Chicago Board of Trade in 1973. 
Following the first stock option, many options were introduced on various underlying 
assets. And the development of options market has accelerated since the 1980s. 
Stock option came on to the Hong Kong stock exchange's agenda more than 
six years ago. Following the 1987 crash and a reform blueprint of securities regulation 
in the territory, the Hay Davison Report of 1988, the exchange has been 
contemplating the introduction of stock options in Hong Kong. After preparation for 
nearly three years, the Stock Exchange launched the first stock options on Hong Kong 
Bank shares in September 8, 1995. This makes Hong Kong the first market in Asia 
where exchange traded stock options are available. Subsequent to the first issue, 
additional eight stock options were introduced by the end of 1995. Ten more stock 
options are to be listed this year. The time schedule of the stock options introduction 
is shown in the figure 5. Both call and put options are introduced on each stocks. 
All stock options are American style. Besides the Stock Exchange adopts the market 
making system to enhance the liquidity of the stock options market. 
Figure 5 The schedule of introduction of stock options 
Huchison 
Swire A China Light 
HK Telecom SHK Properties 
HSBC Cheung Kong CITIC Pacific Henderson Land 
——I~~I 1 1——-
8/9/95 25/9/95 23/10/95 18/12/95 
Stock options have a very strong debut in Hong Kong. In the first month of 
trading, the turnover in the stock options market is 64% of the turnover of the 
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underlying stocks. According to a survey of the International Option Market 
Association, the ratio of stock options' trading to the underlying stock's trading for 
the most actively traded option in a sophisticated market is lower than 30%^. This out-
of-expectation debut indicates a prosperous future of stock options in Hong Kong. 
Nevertheless, the majority participants in stock options market are institutional 
investors. It is said that around 90% of turnover happen among market makers and 
institutional investors. Without active participation of retail investors, it could be hard 
for the stock options market to develop steadily and continuously. 
5 "Stimulating Performance ofStock Options", Sing Tao Daily, October 5, 1995 
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V. COMPARISON OF COVERED WARRANT TO 
STOCK OPTION 
Similarities 
Covered warrant and stock options are quite similar to each other. Covered 
warrant is essentially a long term stock option. In Hong Kong both are American 
options on a company's stocks. The prices of covered warrant and stock option are 
also determined by similar factors: 
• The underlying stock price 
• The exercise price 
• The time to expiration 
• The volatility of underlying stock price 
• The risk-free interest rate 
• The dividends expected during the life of the option 
The price of a call option will increase in the following situations: higher stock 
price, lower exercise price, longer life, higher volatility of stock price, smaller 
dividends. The price of a call option will decrease when the opposite situation present. 
The influence of interest rate on the call option price could be mixed, either positive 
or negative. 
Both of these two instruments allow investors to manage their portfolios 
effectively and efficiently by adopting hedging strategies. 
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Differences 
Despite the great similarity between covered warrants and stock options, there 
are still some fine differences, relating to either the instruments themselves or the 
markets in which they are traded. 
Time span : The common life of covered warrants in Hong Kong is around one 
to two years. The longest life of stock options in Hong Kong is six months. However, 
trading of stock options in distant months is very inactive. Most transactions of stock 
options concentrate on the current month. Thus stock option is mainly used as a short 
term investment vehicle, comparing to the covered warrant. 
Exercise price: Generally, there are less then ten covered warrants on a 
specific stock. The exercise price of each warrant is preset by issuer. In contrast, there 
are usually more than twenty stock options of different exercise prices on a specific 
stock. The exercise prices of stock options are adjusted automatically to changes of 
the underlying stock prices. Therefore, Stock options can offer more choices for 
investors, and is more flexible. 
Conversion ratio: In Hong Kong, the conversion ratio of covered warrant is 
usually 0.1, which means ten warrants can be used to buy one share. The conversion 
ratio of stock option, just the same as those of stock options in other exchanges, is 
one. 
Settlement: The stock options are settled by physical delivery of underlying 
stocks, while covered warrants could be settled in cash payment subject to the 
issuance documents. 
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Trading rules: Trading of covered warrants is regulated by the same rule as 
that for stocks. In the stock options market, market making system is adopted and 
specific regulations are directed to issues like position limit, maximum spread and 
trading volume of every investor. 
Closing of position: In the covered warrants market, only the issuer is the 
writer, all others are buyers. There are two ways by which investors can close their 
position in the covered warrants, selling the covered warrants out to others or simply 
exercising them. In contrast, in the stock options market, every one who meets the 
requirements of the stock exchange can write an option, and this becomes an 
additional way for investors to close their positions. 
Transaction cost: To encourage the development of stock options market in 
Hong Kong, the Hong Kong government exempts stamp duty of transactions in stock 
options for one year. 
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VI. MARKET EXPECTATIONS OF STOCK OPTIONS' 
IMPACTS 
6.1 Historical evidence from index option 
Index option was introduced in Hong Kong at Mar. 5, 1993. Trading of 
warrants around the introduction date of index option is shown in the following chart, 
Figure 6. Total Turnover of Warrants 
Total TurnoverofWarrants 
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It is very obvious that the turnover of warrants declined greatly within six 
months after the inception of index option. Considering that the warrant turnover 
should increase due to very bullish market in that period of time, this evidence seems 
to suggest that the index option has a negative impact on the warrant market. 
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Now that optioned stocks are all major constituent stocks of the Hang Seng 
Index, it is natural to expect that the stock options have the same impact on the 
underlying warrants. 
6-2 Expected impact of stock options 
In US, after the introduction of stock options at the CBOE in 1973, the 
warrants market diminished quickly. Nowadays, trading of warrants only accounts a 
trivial percentage of the total market turnover. The evidence in US leads some market 
practitioners to foresee a similar demise ofHong Kong warrant market after the listing 
of stock options. 
While it might be a little bit exaggerated to predict demise of warrants market 
in Hong Kong, professionals and dealers are generally holding the same opinion on 
the impact of stock options on the underlying covered warrants: 
• After the introduction of stock options, the number of new issues of 
covered warrants will reduce, especially on those optioned stocks. Market 
interest will shift to warrants on second or third liners. 
• Before the introduction of stock options, covered warrant is generally 
overpriced. The introduction of stock option provides covered warrant 
issuers a more convenient and cheap way to hedge their exposure. This 
will lead to a lower level of premium in new issues, which is to the benefit 
of investors.6 
6 Wen Wei Pao, Sep. 5, 1995 
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• The survival of covered warrants depends on options in the same stocks 
becoming liquid, without which investors might be prepared to pay a 
premium for trading options. The arrival of options in stocks might herald 
a switch of investors from the warrants market to the stock options 
market?. 
• A narrower spread indicates a more active and efficient market. If the bid-
ask spread of stock options is very thin, investors will give up warrants and 
g 
trade the options. 
In summary, market participants expect the spread, trading volume and 
premium of warrants would decline, and some investors might switch from the 
traditional warrants market to the newly introduced stock options market. 
7 South China Morning Post, Sep. 12, 1995 
8 Asian Wall Street Joumal, Sep. 11, 1995 
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VII. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The impact of the stock options on the underlying covered warrants mainly 
comes from two sources: the direct competition from stock options; indirect influence 
from changes of the underlying stock market. 
So far, most of the studies concentrate on the relationship between the stocks 
market and the options market, few, if none is on the subject of warrants verse 
options. Moreover, since the stock options were just introduced in Hong Kong about 
half a year ago, no research result has been published. Nevertheless, researches about 
stocks market and options market in other countries, mainly US and UK, have come 
up with some theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that are helpful for 
understanding the Hong Kong situation. In the following sections, we will review the 
results of previous researches, then apply them to Hong Kong market to predict the 
possible impact of options listing on the underlying covered warrants market. 
7.1 The impact of option on the underlying stock market 
Aroused by the 1987 stock market crash, there has been extensive debate 
among academics, practitioners and policy-makers around the issue of whether trading 
in derivative assets accentuates the volatility of the market for the underlying assets. 
Besides questions have also been raised about the impact of listing derivative 
securities on the retums of the underlying assets as well as the effect on trading 
volume and the bid-ask spread. 
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7.1.1 Theoretical arguments 
Expansion of opportunity set 
The distinctive feature of derivative asset that researchers focused on early is 
the role of these assets in making the securities markets more complete. This 
argument made initially by Rose (1977), Hakansson(1978), Breeeden and 
Litzenberger (1978), Arditti and John (1981), is that the introduction of options 
expands the opportunity set faced by investors, thus providing investment choices that 
did not exist hitherto. Although the payoff from a derivative asset could be replicated 
by existing assets, the cost of doing so would be high or even infinite, if regulatory or 
institutional constraints prevent certain portfolio positions. However, one cannot 
conclude that investors are increasingly better off as a result of the introduction of 
options. For instance, there may be a feedback effect on the prices of existing assets 
that make investors worse off. In most cases, however, it is reasonable to think that 
investors are better off by the expansion of the opportunity set they face. In tum, one 
could argue that this reduces the required retum of investors and increases the price of 
the underlying assets. 
More efficient allocation of risk-bearing 
Options allow investors to differ in terms of their risk aversion and 
expectations of returns. DeTemple and Selden (1987, 1988) show that when an option 
is introduced, it permits less risk-averse investors, who also believe that volatility of 
the underlying asset will be high, to shift their demand to options. More risk averse I 
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nvestors with lower volatility estimates do the opposite. These shifts in demand result 
in a more efficient allocation of risk-bearing; the demand for the underlying asset 
increases with a consequent decline in the volatility of the asset. Besides they also 
assume that the existence of an options market allows the diverse opinions of 
investors about underlying asset's volatility to be reflected in the current asset price. 
Informational efficiency 
Grossman (1988) pays his attention to the asymmetry of information between 
market participants. He shows that a market with options is less volatile, because the 
existence of an options market allows the investors' diverse judgments about volatility 
to be reflected in the option prices. If information is not available in the absence of 
options, investors assume the worst, and the market tums out to be more volatile. 
Circumvention of short selling restriction 
Diamond and Verrechia (1987) note that restrictions on short selling impede 
investors from trading on bad news. Prices adjust much more quickly to negative 
information after restriction on short sales are removed, possibly through the 
introduction of put options. 
Destabilizing effect 
There were generally two arguments. The first is the existence of uninformed 
speculators in the market, which, in the presence of trading friction, could cause price 
bubbles. The second is the increase in the speed of response of certain market 
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participants such as index arbitrageurs or purveyors of portfolio insurance, who 
buttress market declines or increases, could increase volatility. 
Stein (1988，1989) argues that there are informational externalities of trading 
in derivative assets, which cause a change in the information content of the price of 
the underlying asset. In this model, speculation using derivative assets has two effects. 
The first one is the conventional one that allows investors to pool risks more 
efficiently and leads to price stability. The other, in the opposition, is that speculative 
agents with inferior information can affect the information content of prices adversely. 
It is possible for the second effect to dominate the first and make the market more 
volatile. 
According to the literature, the theoretical arguments about listing of options 
could be summarized as follows: 
• Options improve the welfare of market participants by making markets more 
complete. This improvement in welfare may lead to a one-time increase in the 
equilibrium stock prices as well as lower retums thereafter. 
• The introduction of options has two effects. One is a stabilizing effect which 
should manifest itself as a reduction in the variance of the underlying asset's 
retum. The other is destabilizing effect that is related to speculation and can cause 
the volatility to increase. The net effect could be either positive or negative. 
• The availability of options allows the market to reflect new information more 
quickly since investors can adjust their portfolios speedily and with lower 
transaction costs. 
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• The availability of derivative securities can make it easier for investors to trade on 
private information and hence increase the quantity and improve the quality of 
information available about the underlying securities. 
• There are micro-structure effects associated with the opening of options market, 
for example, a reduction ofbid-ask spread and an increase in trading volume. 
7.1.2 Empirical evidence 
Listing effect 
Banch and Finnerty (1981) find an average cumulative abnormal retum (CAR) 
of 12.5% in the 47 weeks preceding the listing, of which about 4% occurs in the one 
week preceding the listing. DeTemple and Jorion (1990) document positive CAR 
retums averaging 2.8% in the two weeks around option listing. 
Conrad (1989) makes an attempt to distinguish between the announcement of 
a new listing and the actual listing. She finds a positive CAR averaging 2.95% during 
the period from 10 days prior to 10 days after option listing. However, she finds no 
price effect around the announcement dates. 
Damodaran and Lim (1991b) examine the effect of listing of put options 
separately from call options. They compute a negative listing effect of-1.21% during 
the period from 10 days prior to 10 days after option listing. However, no effect is 
noticed when put and call options were listed simultaneously. The negative effect of 
put options is consistent with the argument ofFiglewski (1981a) who suggests that 
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put options allow investors to get around short sales constraints more efficiently and 
permit bearish views to be reflected in market prices. 
Damodaran and Lim (1991a, 1991b) also examine the mean retums before and 
after the listing of options, documenting that there is no change in the mean daily 
excess retums after the listing. 
In summary, there seems to be evidence that the listing of call options is 
associated with positive excess retums and the listing of put options with negative 
excess retums around the listing date. There is no evidence that the mean retums 
decline after the listing of puts. 
The effect on volatility 
In the earliest study on this issue, Hayes and Tennenbaum (1979) find that the 
optioned stocks experience a decrease in volatility of 15-20% relative to non-optioned 
stocks. Whiteside, Duke and Dunne (1983) find that there is no statistical change in 
the volatility immediately after the introduction of options. However, 90% of the 
optioned stocks have lower variances after a year of listing. Ma and Rao (1986, 1988) 
use a larger sample of 251 stocks with options listed on them, and conclude that 71 
stocks have a higher volatility, while 109 have a lower volatility after option listing. 
Using multivariate analysis, they find that stocks with low retums, high risk, lower 
trading volume and lower growth potential are likely to be stabilized, following the 
listing of option. 
Bransal, Pmitt and Wei (1989) use squared daily retums as a measure of 
volatility and find that this measure is lower by 6.4% in the 100 days after option 1 
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isting. Conrad (1989) uses the volatility of excess retums and finds that the variance 
of daily excess returns declines from an average of 2.29% in the 200 days before 
listing to an average of 1.79% in the 200 days after listing. Damodaran and Lim 
(1991a, 1991b) also examine the effect of listing of put options and conclude that 
when the put options are preceded by call listings in the same stock in earlier periods, 
there is no effect on the volatility of the underlying stocks. 
In summary, there seems to be very strong evidence that the first-time listing 
of options on individual stocks leads to a reduction in the variance of these stocks, 
using either raw or excess returns. This suggests that the positive effects of option 
listing, i.e., the completion of incomplete markets, the increase in quantity and 
improvement in quality of information on the underlying security, outweigh the 
negative effects for options on most individual stocks. 
The effect on the information and price adjustment process 
To study the effect of option listing on the speed of price adjustment, Jennings 
and Stark (1986) find that the prices of optioned stocks adjust more quickly to 
earnings reports than non-optioned stocks of comparable size. The same result is also 
reported in Damodaran and Lim (1991a),s study. 
Upon the question whether options markets reflect new information more 
quickly than the markets for the underlying stocks, Manaster and Rendleman (1982) 
reports that option prices lead stock prices by as much as 24 hours. In a similar vein 
using trading volume date, Anthony (1988) finds that the daily trading volume of 
options leads the daily trading volume in the underlying stock by almost a day. 
However, Whaley and Cheung (1982) conclude in their test that one could not make 
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profits from buying (selling) call options on positive (negative) earnings surprise. 
Most of the option price changes anticipating the earnings information occur during 
the week of the earnings report. Furthermore, Stephan and Whaley (1988) find that 
option prices lag stock prices by 15-20 minutes. 
In summary, there is evidence that the listing of options enriched the 
information set and increases the speed with which prices adjust to information. It also 
plays a role in allowing investors to get around restrictions on short selling and other 
institutional constraints. However, the questions of whether option markets lead the 
stock market is still unresolved, with contradictory findings in the literature. 
Effects on market micro-structure 
Studies that have looked at the effects of option listing in the bid-ask spread 
have come to the general conclusion that spreads on the underlying stock decrease 
after option listing. Neal (1987) documents a lower bid-ask spread for multiple-listed 
options, especially for low volume options. Fedenia and Grammatikos (1989) find that 
the average spreads decrease after option listing for exchange-traded stocks. 
Damodaran and Lim (1991a) measure the serial correlation measure for bid-ask 
spread proposed by Roll (1984) and reach the similar conclusion. 
Studies that look at the effects of option listing on raw and market-adjusted 
trading volume have come to mixed conclusions. Skinner (1989) finds an increase in 
the raw trading volume after the listing of options. Damodaran and Lim (1991a) report 
a similar increase in raw trading volume, but find that the change in market-adjusted 
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trading volume is insignificant. Bansal, Pruitt and Wei (1989) find in their sample 
over the period 1973 - 1986 that the market-adjusted trading volume increases after 
option listing prior to 1979 but not thereafter. 
In summary, the listing of options seems to decrease the bid-ask spread and 
have little effect on market-adjusted trading volume on the underlying stock. The drop 
in the bid-ask spread can be attributed to at least two factors. The first is the 
competition that options markets provide for market-makers in the underlying stock. 
The second is the increase in institutional trading. The lack of dramatic trading 
volume effect is evidence against the hypothesis that options attract speculators into 
the underlying stock market. 
7.1.3 Effects of options listing on stock bid-ask spread 
Among the micro-structure variables, bid-ask spread has been of much more 
interest to researchers because it can reflect, among other things, the degree of 
information heterogeneity among traders (Copeland and Friedman 1987). Changes in 
spreads following the listing of options may provide insights about the importance of 
options in allocating information in financial markets. 
Theoretical and empirical microstmcture researches suggest that the costs of 
processing trades and holding inventory, and the risk of trading against informed 
traders affect security dealer's bid-ask spreads. Inventory-holding costs are associated 
with dealer's portfolio risk and expected holding period (Stoll (1978), Benston and 
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Hagerman (1974)). Informed trading risk arises when the dealer's quoted bid or ask 
price is above or below the "true" price (Copeland and Galai (1983)). 
The effects of options listing on stock spread are well summarized by Fedenia 
and Grammatikos in 1992 in their paper "Options trading and the bid-ask spread of 
the underlying stocks". They group the effects into three categories. 
Information effect 
Grossman (1988) argues that options play a real informational role that cannot 
be fulfilled by dynamic trading strategies in the underlying securities. Options 
increase investors' ability to engage in speculative and hedging activities. In addition, 
the price of the traded option conveys additional information for that security. Both of 
these effects may attract new traders who find the option market to be cost effective. 
Therefore traded options result in a less uncertain and more liquid market for the 
underlying security. According to empirical results from Stoll (1978a, 1978b), lower 
volatility and higher liquidity should result in lower bid-ask spread (ceteris paribus). 
Stein (1987) points out, however, that new traders (speculators) change the 
informational content of prices. In some cases, this inflicts a negative externality on 
those people already in the market: their abilities to make inferences from prices are 
impaired. If this misinformation effect is strong enough relative to the need for 
additional risk sharing, welfare losses can result. Ma and Rao (1988) also argue that 
options trading could transfer excessive "noise" from the options market to the stock 
market. Consequently, volatility may be expected to increase with an increase in 
spreads. If misinformation is defined as uncertainty from information heterogeneity, 
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then Copeland and Friedman (1987) show that bid-ask spreads are positively related 
to the level of misinformation. Therefore, trading of options will have an ambiguous 
effect on bid-ask spreads depending on the net increased benefits of liquidity versus 
the increased cost of misinformation. 
Redistribution effect 
For existing traders, there are potential advantage to trading in the options 
rather than the stock market. Options may allow individual to obtain more favorable 
margin requirements than would be available directly in the stock market or to avoid 
certain impediments to the short sale of stock. For some investors, regular options are 
more cost effective than synthetic options. Finally, difference of commissions in these 
two markets may also provide incentives for switching. 
Conversely, for certain investors, trading in the stock market may be 
advantageous relative to the options market. For long investment horizons, it may be 
necessary to roll over expiring options into new options, exposing the investors to 
transaction costs on multiple transactions. Option position limits may dampen the 
extent to which options can be used to capitalize on superior information. Position 
limits along with various legal restrictions pertaining to financial institutions lead 
most institutional investors to favor direct investment in stocks rather than options. 
Therefore, options compete for order flow against the market of the underlying stock. 
Whether increased order flow competition increases or reduces the spreads of 
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optioned stocks depends largely on how options trading affects the individual 
components of the stock spread. 
Black (1975) suggests that reduced transaction costs, capital requirements and 
trading restrictions in the options market lead information trader to prefer options 
markets over stock markets. If informed trading is skewed toward options markets, 
then dealers' anticipated losses from informed traders will decline, thus providing an 
incentive to reduce the underlying stocks' quoted spreads. Alternatively, Fedenia and 
Grammatikos (1992) argues that if options trading attracts enough liquidity-motivated 
traders, the liquidity in the stock market may decrease and the specialist's inventory-
related costs may increase. In this case, stock dealers will be motivated to increase the 
spreads for the underlying stock. 
Thus, stock spreads may increase or decrease depending on whether liquidity 
motivated traders or informed traders migrate to the options market, respectively. The 
migration of trading to the options market implies a liquidity decrease that 
distinguishes the redistribution effect from the information effects. The information 
effects imply that new traders arrive, thus producing and increase in liquidity. 
Volatility effects 
Fedenia and Grammatikos (1992) argue that, for listing, options exchange 
might consider stocks exhibiting volatility increases because the cost of maintaining 
dynamic options-like payoff is likely to increase for stocks achieving higher volatility 
levels. If volatility changes motivate exchanges to list options on these stocks, then 
spread changes commensurate with the volatility changes may not be entirely 
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attributable to listing effects. That is, spread changes might not be caused by listing, 
per se; rather, it may be that prelisting volatility changes spuriously carry forward into 
the postlisting period and drive spread changes. 
7.2 Prediction of changes in the covered warrants market 
Most of the aforementioned arguments are applicable to the warrants market. 
In this section, we will discuss the possible changes of the underlying covered 
warrants market after stock options listing, taking into account the Hong Kong 
situation. 
7.2.1 Volatility of covered warrant return 
It has been shown in the previous part that warrant price is determined by the 
underlying stock price and volatility, the interest rate, time to maturity and exercise 
price. Within a short period around the date of options listing, we can assume that the 
interest rate remains unchanged. If the covered warrants have a long time to 
expiration, we can also assume the time to maturity will not affect the warrant price. 
The exercise price is preset. Therefore, we can attribute any changes of warrant price 
around the listing date to the other two factors: the stock price and its volatility. 
Based on literature, the volatility of underlying stock, in general, would 
decrease after options listing. However, for each individual stock the volatility effect 
might be different. As shown by Ma and Rao (1986, 1988) that only those stocks 
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with low returns, high risk, lower trading volume and lower growth potential are 
likely to be stabilized, following the listing of option. This finding suggests that there 
could be an increase of volatility for certain stocks. Besides call and put stock options 
are introduced simultaneously in Hong Kong. Since put and call options have opposite 
impact on the underlying stocks, the net effect could be even uncertain. Nevertheless, 
the trading of put stock options is very inactive in Hong Kong and short selling 
restriction has been relaxed on those optioned stocks. Thus we assume that the 
changes of the underlying stock market are mainly due to the inception of call stock 
options. 
The leverage nature of warrant makes its volatility an amplified expression of 
the volatility of the underlying stock. Thus it could be expected that different warrants 
experience different changes of volatility. 
7.2.2 Trading volume 
The direct competition between covered warrants and stock options could lead 
to a significant reduction of trading volume in the covered warrants market. As 
discussed in previous section, stock options are more flexible than covered warrants in 
hedging activities. The standardization of contract terms and the market making 
system make stock option market more efficient than the covered warrant market. 
Now that the transaction costs in the two markets are similar, investors might shift 
their trading from the covered warrants market to the stock options market. 
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It is also assumed that the stock option could enrich the information set 
available to investors. If the adjustment speed of warrant price to new information 
increases accordingly, arbitrage opportunities between the stocks market and the 
warrants market would be reduced, leading to less trading in the warrants market. 
However, if the arbitrage trading only accounts for a small portion of the total trading 
in the warrants market, the reduction would not be very significant. 
If investors take warrant as long term investment vehicle, it would still be 
advantageous for them to trade in the warrant market. Otherwise they have to pay 
extra transaction costs to roll over their position in stock options and risk higher price 
to maintain the same position level. 
If reduced volatility of stock price after option listing leads to lower warrant 
price, the gearing ratio would increase. This could make warrant more attractive an 
instrument than before provided the investor's intention is to take advantage of 
warrant's leverage nature. Moreover, reduced volatility might attract some more risk-
averse investors from the stocks market to the warrants market. These two possible 
effects could help stabilize the trading volume. 
Besides, the trading of stock options demands for more sophisticated 
expertise. Investors, especially those individual investors, who do not have this 
expertise might be hindered from trading in the stock options market. They will 
remain trading in the warrants market. 
In summary, the trading volume could decline or remain stable after options 
listing. The net effect depends on which of the several factors mentioned above are 
more dominant. 
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7.2.3 Bid-ask spread 
The warrant's bid-ask spread could be analyzed in the same way as that for 
stocks. Some arguments about changes ofbid-ask spread are as follows: 
First, the availability of stock options permits dealers to hedge themselves 
more effectively and efficiently against adverse selection trading around events that 
are accompanied by significant uncertainty, such as interim earnings report 
announcement. If the transaction costs of engaging in the options market are less than 
the expected losses to informed traders, dealers in the warrant market would charge 
lower bid-ask spreads. 
Second, stock options could be a superior vehicle for informed traders because 
of the availability of more trading strategies. Now that most informed traders are 
presumably able to trade in the stock options market, they may shift their trading from 
the warrant market to the stock options market. This will reduce the pressure on 
dealers in the warrants market. Consequently they will lower their bid-ask spreads. 
Third, the possible reduction of trading volume and increase of volatility in the 
covered warrants market could lead to an increased inventory-holding costs. Dealers 
in warrants market might raise the level of bid-ask spreads to compensate these higher 
costs. 
Fourth, empirical studies have shown that bid-ask spread is inversely related to 
price level. If warrant prices increase due to either increased stock price or volatility, 
there could be a tendency of spread reduction. 
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Fifth, if investors want to pursue long term investment objectives, covered 
warrants would remain attractive comparing to stock options. Otherwise investors 
have to pay additional transaction costs to roll over their option position and spend 
much more effort to supervise not only the long term but also the short term market 
trend. If the liquidity of the warrants market does not change significantly, dealers 
would not change their bid-ask spread very much. 
Similar to previous discussions, the bid-ask spread is influenced by several 
contradictory factors. The uncertainty of changes of these factors after options listing 
must lead to a very dynamic adjustment process for the bid-ask spreads. The net effect 
could be determined by those factors that are more dominant over other factors. 
7.2.4 Additional considerations 
Covered warrant is not a very standardized instrument, comparing to stock 
option. Some additional factors might also contribute to the changes in the covered 
warrants market. 
First, Hong Kong is the only market in the world where stock options are 
introduced after index option. Before the introduction of stock options, index option 
had been traded for more than two years. As the HSI is heavily influenced by 
performances of several super-companies' stocks, like HSBC and Cheung Kong, the 
index option can partially fulfill the functions of stock options on these companies. 
Therefore the impact of stock options on these companies' covered warrants would be 
limited. 
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Second, it is imaginable that stock options would have the most impact on 
those covered warrants with time to expiry roughly the same with that of stock 
options. Thus it can be expected that covered warrants with different maturity date 
would react to stock options in a slightly different way. 
Third, changes of options market's variables are not in linear relation to those 
of the underlying stocks. The out-of-money and in-the-money covered warrants 
should respond to the options listing differently. 
Fourth, covered warrants are issued by different issuers, which implies 
different levels of credit risk for investors. It is possible, therefore, that covered 
warrants issued by different issuers demonstrate different pattems of change. 
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VIIL DATA ANALYSIS 
8_1 Data Selection 
Data Source 
The data used in this study comes the Daily Quotation of Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange and Hong Kong Securities Journal. We use the warrant's trading data from 
the beginning of May 1995 to the end of February 1996. The data extracted from the 
Daily Quotation includes bid prices, ask prices, closing prices and trading volume of 
specific studied warrants as well as the total trading shares of the underlying stock. 
The data extracted from Hong Kong Security Joumal includes warrant's subscription 
starting date, subscription maturity date，conversion ratio and exercise price. 
Warrants Selection 
A total of 22 covered warrants issued by eleven brokers are used to evaluate 
the impact of the introduction of stock options. During the studied period from May 
1995 to February 1996, there were totally 82 covered warrants being traded in the 
SEHK. As we think the impact mainly comes from trading in call options, only those 
call covered warrants, mature after the introduction of options (i.e. after Dec. 18, 
1995) and start trading before the introduction of the options (i.e. before Sept. 8, 
1995) are selected in our sample. Detailed information of all the 22 covered warrants 




To control the influence of general market movement, we study the impact of 
stock options on the underlying warrants using both raw data and adjusted data of 
daily spread, daily turnover and daily return of the covered warrants. The methods of 
adjustments are as follows: 
Spread = Ask - Bid 
Turnover = Daily traded units of a warrant 
Ask - Bid 
Adjusted spread - 7 -7^—;^^"~— x 100 
J “ {Ask + Bid)y>05 
， ， Daily traded units of a warrant 
Adjusted turnover 
Total daily traded sharesof underlying stock 
， . . r ，、 Clo sin e price, - Clo sin ^  price,, 
Re turn, (Both raw data and adjusted) 二 — ~ ~ r ————.100 
Clo sin g price,_^ 
Use of data 
To conduct an event study, we take the date of stock option introduction as 
time zero (t=0). Suppose, there are i trading days before the introduction of option and 
there are j {j >= i) trading days after the introduction of option, only the data from t 二 
-i to t = +/ will be used. This is because we intend to have equal number of trading 
days on both sides of t=0 so as to evaluate the impact of introduction of stock options 
on the underlying covered warrants more accurately. Figure 7 demonstrates the 
situation. 
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For the spread regression model, we used all the data available of every spread 
related variables so as to fully capture the relationship between spread and these 
variables. 
Figure 7 Use of data 
Only data 
^ ^ . __^ ^^ ^^  / between t=-i and 
X ^ " " 7 ^ t=+iareused. 
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8.4 Spread Regression Model 
According to the Stoll's (1978) inventory adjustment model, percentage spread 
is positively related to the total return variance in dealer's trading portfolio and 
negatively related to the price level caused by the dealer's order processing costs 
(Stoll(1978)) and the discrete nature of the price changes (Harris(1990)). 
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An empirical adaptation to Stoll's model to time-series data on individual covered 
warrants can be expressed as^: 
SPt =ao +a^PRC, +aJVOL, +a^VAR, +a^PER^ +e, 
f=.. ,100.. , l ,0,+l. . .+100.. . 
where 
SPt = daily percentage spread on day t defined as [(Ask^ - Bidt)/(0.5(Askt + Bid())] 
PRCt = daily closing price on SEHK 
TVOLt= natural log of daily trading volume 
VARt = a measure of daily variance estimated by (71/2),2! R( _ R 
where R^  is the daily retum of warrant on day t and; 
R is the mean warrant retum over the model estimation period 
The variables PRC, TVOL, and VAR control for variations in the dealer's 
order processing and inventory holding costs over time. Because informed trading 
cost is also positively related to percentage spreads, its effect should be impounded in 
the intercept term (oco). A significant positive intercept is therefore consistent with the 
presence of positive informed trading cost. The intercept would be an unbiased 
reflection of the informed trading cost to the extent that the spread regression model is 
correctly specified. If there are omitted variables that have a positive (negative) effect 
on the percentage spreads, the intercept term over-estimates (under-estimates) the 
magnitude of the informed trading cost. To determine whether informed trading risk 
changes following the commencement of corresponding stock option, we include a 
9 Similar empirical designs are used by Venkatesh and Chiang (1986) to study temporal changes in the informed 
trading risk component of spreads around dividend/earnings announcements, and Franz, Rao and Tripathy to 
study the informed trading risk and bid-ask spread changes around open market stock repurchases in the 
NASDAQ market. 
41 
dummy variable (PER) that equals one for day 1 to day i and zero otherwise. 
Inference about changes in the informed trading cost around the stock option 
commencement date (as captured by the coefficient for the dummy variable 0c4) will 
be biased only if the spread regression model is incompletely specified and the levels 
of the omitted variables are systematically affected by the stock option 
commencement. 
8.4 Results and Analysis 
The original test results are in the appendix 4. The analyses of these results are 
in the following sections. 
8.4.1 Return 
Table 1: Result of Return Test 
Panel A: Market Average 
Mean of return Std. Dev. of return 
~~Before~~ After ~Change~~ t-Test Before After Change F-test 
0.00213 0.0181678 -46.78% 0.504853 0.057921 0.104860 79.23% 0.24804 
Panel B: Classification of results 
Mean of return Std. Dev. of return 
Significant Insignificant Total Significant “Insignificant ~~Total""" 
Increase 0 9 9 7 ?0 ?7 
Decrease 0 Ts Ts 1 4 5 
1 ¾ 0 ^ l2 8 M ^~~ 
Panel A ofTable 1 shows the change of retum after stock options introduction. 
Taking the 22 covered warrants as a portfolio, the introduction of stock options leads 
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to a decrease of average return and an increase of volatility of the portfolio. However, 
neither of the changes is statistically significant at 95% confidence interval. 
When we look further into the situation of individual warrant, as shown in 
Panel B, we find that none of the sample warrants shows significant increase of mean 
retums. However 17 warrants show increases of volatility after stock option 
introduction, with 7 of them being significant at 95% confidence level. Among all the 
warrants, only one shows significant decrease of volatility after option introduction. 
This result seems to suggest that stock option introduction, by and large, does 
not change the warrants' price levels, but tends to make the underlying covered 
warrants more volatile. Reasons underlying this result might be: 
• First, the warrant's price and its volatility respond to changes of the 
underlying stocks market in different ways. If the price of the underlying 
stock does not change significantly and its volatility increases, it is 
possible that the warrant's prices do not significantly, but the warrant's 
volatility would change very greatly due to the gearing effect. 
• Second, switching of some investors from the warrants market to the stock 
options market leads to a lower liquidity in the warrant market, 
consequently higher volatility. Meanwhile the competition between the 
warrant and stock option discourage increase in warrant price. 
• Third, increased speculation in these covered warrants around the stock 
options listing dates might contribute to the increased volatility. 
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8.4.2 Trading Volume 
Event studies are conducted for every warrant, using both raw data and market 
adjusted data, to test whether their turnovers change before and after the introduction 
date. The result is summarized in Table 2. 
Panel A shows the result for sample warrants as a whole. The results from the 
raw data and adjusted data are roughly the same. Both the mean and standard 
deviation of turnover show increases after the stock option listing, but neither is 
statistically significant at 95% confidence level. Consistent with the result from the 
retum test, the introduction of stock options does not affect the underlying covered 
warrants market significantly. 
Nevertheless, when we group these warrants into several categories as shown 
in Panel B, we find that the changing pattem of trading volume is different from that 
of returns. In the return test, the insignificant change of the average retum is due to 
insignificant change of retum of nearly every warrant. But in the trading volume test, 
the insignificant change of average market turnover is due to some warrants' trading 
volume increasing while the others decreasing. 
The results from both raw data and adjusted data show that there are more than 
half of the warrants experiencing significant changes in turnover. The number of 
warrants with increased turnover is roughly equal to that of warrants with decreased 
turnover. The conclusion from this test could be that stock option introduction does 
have impact on the underlying covered warrant's trading volume. However, the 
impact could be either positive or negative. 
44 
Table 2: Result Summary of Turnover 
Panel A: Market Average 
Results from Raw Data . 
Mean of turnover Std. Dev. ofturnover 
~ ~ B e f o r e ~ After ~~Change~~~t-Test Before After ~ C h a n g e ~ " F-test 
4365747.2 6.15E+06 66.35% 0.16041 4.37E+06 4.59E+06 36.19% 0.051356 
Results from Adjusted Data 
Mean of turnover Std. Dev. ofturnover 
“ B e f o r e ~ After ~~Change~~~t-Test Before After ~~~Change~~ F-test 
0.2857509 0.39634 35.78% 0.14557 0.25706 0.26934 11.45% 0.08333 
Panel B: Classification of results 
Results from Raw Data 
Mean ofTurnover Std. Dev. ofTurnover 
Significant Insignificant Total Significant ~ Ins ign i f i can t “ Total 
Increase 8 6 U 7 6 ^3 
Decrease 3 5 8 8 1 9 
T ^ U U ^ Ts 7 ^ 
Results from Adjusted Data 
Mean of Turnover Std. Dev. of Turnover 
Significant Insignificant Total Significant Insignificant Total 
Increase 8 3 U 7 1 8 
Decrease 6 5 11 10 4 14 
1 ¾ U 8 ^ U 5 ^ 
Panel C: Reclassification of results 
Raw Data Volatility of Turnover 
Sig. Increase Sig. Decrease Unchanged 
""^Significant 6 0 2 
Increase 
Mean of ~~Significant 0 3 5 
Turnover Decrease 
Unchanged 1 5 
Adjusted Volatility of Turnover 
Data 
Sig. Increase Sig. Decrease Unchanged 
~"Significant 6 0 2 
Increase 
Mean of Significant 0 5 1 
Turnover Decrease 
Unchanged 1 5 2 
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Tuming to the part about the standard deviation of trading volume, we find 
that two thirds of all the covered warrants experience stabilized liquidity after stock 
options introduction. If institutional investors and speculators are the major creator of 
volatility, this evidence could suggest a switching of them from warrants market to 
the stock options market. However there are still about one third of all the warrants 
with an increase of volatility in trading volume, which could suggest divergent 
preferences of investors to different warrants. 
Now that there is no consistent changing pattem for all the warrants, we 
regroup these warrants according to the significance of changes in both mean and 
standard deviation, so as to explore possible reasons. The result is shown in Panel C. 
The tests from raw data and adjusted data show similar results again. There are three 
categories which contain most of the warrants: 
• Six warrants demonstrate significant change in both mean and standard 
deviation of trading volume. This is out of our expectation which states 
that the trading volume should decrease after stock option listing. 
Suggested by some newspaper reports, we attribute this abnormal increase 
of turnover to increased speculative trading in these warrants around the 
stock option listing date. Certainly, it is also possible that the increased 
volatility is simply a result of increased trading level. 
• Five warrants show significant decreases in both mean and standard 
deviation of trading volume, which suggests deteriorated liquidity in these 
warrants' tradings. This result coincides with our expectation. It indicates 
that there might be switching of investors, most possibly institutional 
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investor, from the warrants market to the stock options market, which 
leads to the decline of trading volume. If most of the remaining investors 
are individual investors who trade less frequently than institutional 
investors and usually take warrants as medium to long term investment 
instrument rather than hedging instrument, the volatility of turnover will be 
consequently lower. 
• Five warrants experience significant decrease in standard deviation of 
trading volume, but with unchanged trading levels. This could be 
reasonable if trading of these warrants mainly comes from individual 
investors both before and after the stock options listing, with occasional 
speculation and hedging from institutional investors accounting only a 
small portion of the total turnover. After the introduction of stock options, 
those noisy traders would be attracted away to the stock options market. 
The volatility of turnover will decrease, but the average trading level could 
remain unchanged. 
In summary, this evidence seems to suggest that the composition of investors 
and different purposes in trading warrants are major factors in affecting the liquidity 
of the warrants market around the listing dates of the stock options. Those warrants 
with more trading from institutional investors before stock options listing tend to 
change in liquidity. So do those warrants which are frequently chosen as speculation 
and hedging vehicles. This could partially explain the divergent patterns of impact of 
stock options on different warrants. However, without concrete statistics of trading 
activities of various investors in the warrants market and without cross examination of 
the changes in the underlying stock and options markets, no result can be conclusive. 
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8.4.3 Spread 
The test results for spreads are summarized in Table 3. The results from raw 
data and adjusted data are similar. 
Table 3: Result of Spread Test 
Panel A: Market Average 
Results from Raw Data 
Mean of Spread Std. Dev. ofSpread 
Before~~ After Change t-Test Before After ~~Change~~ F-test 
0.023357 0.025575 11.81% 0.116564 0.013461 0.019258 50.30% 0.143347 
Results from Adjusted Data 
Mean of Spread Std. Dev. of Spread 
Before~~ After Change t-Test Before After ~~Change~" F-test 
2.20814 2.3082713 17.70% 0.265742 1.138149218 1.541845213 54.05% 0.116611 
1 
Panel B: Classification of results 
Results from Raw Data 
Mean of Spread Std. Dev. of 
Spread 
Significant ~~Insignificant~~~ Total Significant Insignificant Total 
Increase 8 3 V\ 7 5 ?2 
Decrease 6 5 Tl 6 4 To 
7 ¾ U 8 ^ ?3 9 ^ 
Results from Adjusted Data 
Mean of Spread Std. Dev. of 
Spread 
Significant Insignificant Total Significant Insignificant Total 
Increase 5 7 T i 7 4 V\ 
Decrease 4 6 To 5 6 T^  
1 ¾ 9 Ts ^ ?2 To ^ 
Panel A shows the general impact of stock option introduction on the spread of 
covered warrants. Although there are increases of both spread and its volatility, 
neither of them is significant at 95% confidence interval. 
Panel B farther discloses that the impact of stock option on spread is 
inconsistent over different warrants. Around thirds of the 22 warrants show increased 
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spread or spread volatility, another one third shows the opposite, while the left show 
no change at all. This result is quite similar to that of turnovers, which suggests that 
unique rather than common characteristics of each warrant determine the extent to 
which the stock options introduction could affect the warrants trading. 
8.4.4 Spread regression 
As we have discussed in the literature review part, several factors like order 
processing costs and informed trading risk could contribute to the change of spread. 
To explore possible reasons of the divergent impact patterns of spreads, we use the 
spread regression model to conduct a further test on spread. The test results are shown 
in Table 4. 
The focus of the spread regression model study is on the sign and significance 
of coefficient 0c4, which captures the shift of the informed trading risk following the 
introduction of stock option. For all the data available, the coefficient of PER is 
negative for 63.6% of the warrants, but is not statistically significant at both 95% and 
990/0 confidence level. By and large, the signs of coefficients of the variables are 
consistent with their theoretic expectations. 
The coefficient of price represents the informed trading cost and it should be 
theoretically positive. The coefficient of the dummy variable represents the increase 
or decrease of informed trading cost around the commencement of the stock option 
introduction. 
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Table 4 Results from the spread regression model 
" " " ^ ^ ^ " y PRC TVOL VAR PER p-values p-values p-values p-values p-values 
Intercept x1 coef x2 coef x3 coef x4 coef Intercept x1 x2 x3 x4 
ciric - “ 
^ 5.0344 -0.0844 -0.2198 3.1189 -0.3274 5.0344 -0.0844~-0.2198 3.1189 - 0 . 3 ^ 
m B g r a g ^ T 3 ^ ; f P ^ 3 l " T T ^ ^ a 0 9 3 5 | ^ ^ ^ M ~ ~ 0 0 ^ ~ a O ^ 0.4271 0.8144 
1165 ^ ^ ^ ^ " I 3 ! 4 T ^ -0.8338 -1.9039 ' ^ 3 ! 2 2 T l B ^ ^ ^ y 0.3281 ~ 0 . 0 4 4 3 0.3958 0.0416 
CK — — -
T m 1.8325 -0.1712 0.0039 -0.5945 -0.0976 ~ 0 . 0 1 6 8 “ 0 . 5 5 6 0 ~~0.9341 0.0975 ~ 0 . 3 0 8 4 
^ ^ ^ ^ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ^ ^ _ ^ ^ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ — — — ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ M _ > M _ * i i * ^ * > > * ^ _ 
I m g ] j T " p r n i n n n i i i " F F T T | m m o.i33i" o . o i 9 7 " 0.9728 — 0.1336 
CLP ^ ^ ^ “ — _ 
I ^ y ^ ^ ^ . 3 3 1 7 g > | ^ ^ -0.5975 ^ 0 l 3 2 4 j ^ ^ | M q 0 . 6 7 1 2 M E K q 0.2280 ~ 0.5391 
678 ^ M ^ ^ f a ^ ^ ^ S s S S 3.5707 " " 0 ? T 2 0 5 ^ ^ ^ ^ H ^ ^ ^ g ^ ^ ^ ^ 0.1140 ~ 0 . 7 7 7 7 
HKT ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ -
702 j ^ ^ ^ g ^ 7 4 0 9 | ^ Q . 2 6 2 4 K ^ y J 0 3 8 0 3 p E ^ j j j 0.5462 0 . 0 0 6 3 ¾ ¾ ^ ^ 0.0307 
HTL I I r ^ i � I I 
915 " | ^ ^ ^ a - 0 . 5 8 4 2 M ^ M 3 . 0 2 6 8 p r Q T T 8 p j g ^ r t ~ " " 0 4 6 T I ^ ^ ^ j j q 0.2562 0.0562 
HS^ ] ^ ^ ^ I “ 
4¾ 0 4 ^ ^ T 6 ^ -0.0537"0l462 -0.2126 0.010s| 0.0460| 0.5320 0.3400 0.3448 
515 j W M K | i M -0.2181 - 0 . 5 9 7 7 ^ [ g | i j a j ^ 5 ! ^ ^ ^ ^ j j [ ^ | g j | | ^ ~ ~ a 2 7 0 7 M E | > g g M 0.0010 ~ 0 . 3 8 0 1 
^ B y ^ g h g y j | y - Q . 1 1 1 9 0.2618 " ^ 0 3 8 T 5 ^ B ^ M | | ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ n ^ — 0.6311 _ 0.0200 
682 ^ a ^ 7 9 9 B B B " a 0 ^ 0.1604 0.0404 ^ ^ U 2 l 8 ^ ^ ^ f f l ~ ~ 0 . 9 1 9 3 0.8623 ~ 0 . 9 6 8 7 
F ^ _ ^ J I H ^ 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ] ^ ^ ^ ^ m j ^ | j ^ j ^ ^ - 0 . 2 1 1 1 1.0342 Q . 3 3 8 4 ^ ^ ^ ^ g 0.9564 0.0175 0.2757 0.0700 
T ^ 1.9012 -0.0437 -0.0331 -0.0835 0 . 0 6 1 5 ^ ^ ^ 4 ^ 0.6873| 0.5977 0.4790 ~ 0 . 7 2 0 2 
HWL 一 — I I - — 
77fi ~ ^ ^ ^ ^ s D 》 S S Q ^ [ j m j g ^ J j | j ^ | " ^ 5 ! ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ~ ~ a 0 2 0 T M ^ g g j [ j j j | ^ ^ 0.3541' 
761 ^ T j O 7 8 | 3 ! 2 7 y r -0.3646 1.4131 ^ T 4 6 6 2 ^ a ^ ^ 0 . 8 2 5 1 ^ 0 ^ 7 ? 0.7632 ~ 0 2 3 W 
^ J E B B H ^ Q ^ ^ 1 0 3 , 2.0121 " 0 7 3 8 7 [ j g ^ ^ 0.0744 0.0090 0.5301 ~ 0 3 ^ 
SHK - - ^ ^ ^ ^ 一 
909 ^ l j ^ D 0 -0.1474 -0.7004 1.2692 ~ ^ o T m 0.0127| 0.7553+ 0.0367 ~ 0.4474 ~ 0 ? 7 6 ^ 
1195 | j ^ ^ ^ | j ^ : , ~ ^ ^ 4 „ M ? _ 0 . 5 9 3 9 " ^ 3 ; 5 § 7 ^ | ^ | ^ ^ ^ j g g g ^ " " ^ F ! p ; ^ l ^ 0.2907 0.6571 
SPA I — 
^ -19 3 2 6 s j m ^ 1.2500 -0.0994 -1.2182 0 . 2 2 3 9 ^ B g E ^ j Q.1Q83 0.8484 ~ 0 . 2 9 6 5 
1176 " l E ^ | ^ l 8 7 6 ^ g ^ : ^ 3 : 1 8 Q 0 p g ^ O Q 2 4 4 M ^ ^ 
Average 6.4955 -2.6062 -0.2313"l.4167 -0.1831 0.2498 ~~0.3090 ~ 0 . 1 5 0 7 0.5050 ~~0.3432 
Expected + - - + -
Sign 
% 0.9545 0.8636 0.8636 0.7727 0.6364 
Expected 
Sign L _ ^ _ _ 
Significant at 95% ~ ~ 
Confidence Level 
The t-test of coefficients at 95% and 99% confidence level aims at examining 
whether the coefficients are significantly different from zero. If a coefficient is 
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significantly different from zero at 95% and/or 99% level, it implies that the 
corresponding variable is an important factor in explaining the bid-ask spread. 
The coefficient of the dummy variable is expected to be negative which means 
a reduction of informed trading risk after the stock options listing. Around two thirds 
of our sample confirm this expectation, which implies that there might be shifting of 
informed traders from the covered warrants market to the stock options market. 
However, the results from t-test of these coefficients show that most of them are 
insignificantly different from zero, or in other words, the switching of informed 
traders is not a major factor in determining the spread around the listing date of stock 
options. The explanations for this result could be three tiers: first, there is no informed 
trader in some of the covered warrant markets before and after the introduction of 
stock options; second, there is no switching of informed traders; third, the switching 
of informed investors is so limited that can not cause substantial change of the 
covered warrants' spreads. This result is opposite to the original market expectation 
which states that institutional investors (most likely informed traders) will switch 
from the covered warrants market to the stock options market. If limited or no 
switching is a right assumption, the unchanged or even increased turnover of certain 
warrants, which is observed in the turnover test, would not be a question any more. 
The assumption of no or limited informed trading risk in some warrants' 
trading is confirmed by the results of intercept of the regression model. There are 
more than one fourth of all the tested warrants showing insignificant intercepts, which 
means that the informed trading cost is not an important factor that affects the spread 
of these warrants. In fact, this is nothing abnormal. In the booming period of warrants, 
investors will buy whatever warrants that are available and most of the time they can 
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realize profits. After the market downturn in 1994, investors in the warrants market 
became more conservative than before. The market is much more a stock-picking 
market.io Not all warrants are attractive any longer. Investors would choose to trade 
only those warrants which are best fit to their portfolio position or hedging strategies. 
Thus it is reasonable to see that some warrants are neglected by those informed 
traders. If this is the case, it also provides support of our argument in the previous part 
that investors trading different warrants are of different investment purposes or 
preferences. Consequently, the composition of trading activities in each warrants will 
lead to divergent performances of covered warrants around the listing dates of stock 
options. 
Among all the four variables in the regression model, it is quite obvious that 
the turnover or the liquidity of the warrants is the most important factor in affecting 
the spread. This is because 11 out 22 warrants' coefficients are significantly different 
from zero, while the number is 6 and 4 for price level and variance respectively. 
It is not a surprise that price level and variance are not important factors in 
influencing warrant spread. Traditionally, the warrant market is very volatile. Dealers 
have already got used to the high volatility and would only adjust their bid-ask 
spreads when the change of volatility is very large in percentage term. The volatility 
of warrants market is closely related to the underlying stocks market. The literature 
has suggested that the introduction of stock options tends to lead to a less volatile 
stock market. Therefore, even though the stock option listing could introduce 
additional noises into the warrants market, change of the warrant's volatility would 
not be large enough to cause dealers to increase their bid-ask spreads. 
1° "Thriving in ajittery market", Asiamoney, November 1995, p. 36 
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A similar argument could be made for the price level variable. Results in the 
retum test have shown that the warrant prices do not change significantly after the 
stock option listing. Therefore, the price level would not an important factor in 
determining the warrant spreads when stock options are introduced. 
If the trading of certain warrant is very liquid, illiquid or equally liquid before 
and after stock option listing, it is possible that the liquidity in the warrant is not a 
major concem of dealers in considering to change their bid-ask spreads. However, if 
the warrant's liquidity is very vulnerable to external factors like the introduction of 
stock options, any change in the spread could be attributed to the changed liquidity. 
Now that the change of liquidity could be due to various reasons, like new entrance of 
investors, increased investment or trading frequency of existing investors or changed 
composition of investors in the warrant market, it is very possible for the covered 
warrants to demonstrate divergent patterns of change in spreads. 
In summary, the results from decomposition of spread confirm our 
assumptions in previous parts. Although there is no consistent changing pattem 
across all the warrants, the reasons underlying the changes are basically the same: the 
mixture of investors, purposes of trading specific warrant, and changes of the 
underlying stock market, as well as possible speculations around the listing date. The 
net effect depends on which factor(s) is (are) more dominant than others. 
8.4.5 Exploration of additional factors 
In the literature review part we have suggested that some instrument-related 
factors might be explanations of the possible changes in the warrants market. To test 
53 
these assumptions, we sort all previous test results according to the following 
dimensions: company, broker, time to maturity, in-the-money, out-of-money and at-
the-money. The results are shown in Appendix 5, 
Partly due to the small sample size, we find no obvious pattem associated with 
dimensions as of company, broker or time to maturity. Some of the obscure patterns 
are summarized as follows: 
a) There is a decrease in daily retum of most warrants with maturity date 
later than November 1996. 
b) All property business related warrants such as CK, HL and SHK show 
decrease in spreads. 
c) Most warrants issued by UBS are of decreased spread, turnover and retum. 
However, in the case of the maturity date, we find some relatively strong 
connections between the changes and the price status of the warrants. We summarize 
the status of in-the-money and out-of-the-money of the covered warrants studied in 
table 5. 
. Most of the warrants selected are in-the-money. 36.4% of them are of 
increased spreads and 40.9% of them are of decreased spreads. 50% of the warrants 
with in-the-money status are of increased turnover and 27.3% of them are of 
decreased turnover. 40.9% of the warrants with in-the-money status are of increased 
daily return and 36.4% of them are of decreased daily retum. 
All the warrants with at-the-money status are of increased turnover and 
decreased retum. Besides, all the warrants with out-of-the-money status are of 
increased spreads and increased retum levels. 
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Table 5 Price status of warrants at the introduction dates ofcorresponding stock options. 
Code in~|Covered”[Broker ~ C l o s i n g “ ~ S t r i k e “ Percentage In / 
SEHK Warrants Stock Price Price / Difference At/ 
in one day Conver- of Strike Out-
before the sion price and of-the-
introduction Ratio Stock price money 
of option {HK$) 
(HK$) 
— 548 CitlC96 Morgan 23.750 16.450 -30.74% In 
— 591 CITIC96 U 1 ^ 23.750 17.750 -25.26% In 
1l6SCiTIC96 S.G. War 23.750 22.600 -4.84% At 
‘ 1109 CK96 ^ L — 41.100 37.750" -8.15% in 
1225 CK97 ^ - g a n 41.100 27.450 — -33.21% — In 
427 CLP96 BT 一 35.400 34.000" -3.95% In 
“ 678 ^ P 9 7 ^ s s 35.400 32.640 ~ ‘ -7.80% In 
‘ 702 HKT96 BT — 13.750 11.305" -17.78% In 
915HL96 Morgan 一 46.100_ 41.130 -10.78% In 
“ 1115HSBC95 ML — 105.500 87.000" -17.54% In 
424 HSBC96 BZW — 105.500 120.000 13.74% Out 
515HSBC96 lwiss — 105.500 88.250 -16.35% In 
630 HSBC96 Pereder 一 105.500 109.000 3.32% At 
^ HSBC96 RFIem 105.500 131.000 24.17% Out 
1226 HSBC97 Morgan 105.500 72.450 - 3 1 . 3 ^ In — 
^ HWL96 UBS — 44.800 26.100 -41.74% In 
• 761 HWL96 CL — 44.800 26.860 -40.04% In 
^ HWL97 Pereder “ 44.丽 32.000 -28.57% In 
909 SHK96 Pereder 60.250 46.000 - 2 3 . 6 ^ In — 
^M95SHK96 CARR 60.250 — 56.000 -7.05%— In 
^ SPA96 —RFIem 一 61.250 62.000 1.22% At 
1176 SPA96 Pereder “ 61.250 40.000 -34.69% In 
Table 6 The changes of Spread, Turnover and Return with respect to warrants'price status 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ m Spread Turnover Return 一 
i l M _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ " " ^ - + - ~ ^ -
Out ofthe Money 9.1% 4.5% 4.5% 9.1% 
^ t the Money 9.1% 4.5% 13.6% ~ "H.6% 
TntheMoney 3 6 . 4 % 40.9o/o 5 0 . 0 % 2 7 . 3 % ~ ^ . 9 % 3 6 . 4 " / ~ 
一 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% — 
It is obvious that at-the-money and out-of-money warrants tend to become 
more volatile after the introduction of stock options, while most in-the-money 
warrants do not experience change of volatility. Nevertheless, as our sample size is 
very small, no definite conclusion can be made. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
In this research, we study the covered warrants market of Hong Kong by 
analyzing 22 covered warrants' data from May 1, 1995 to Feb. 29, 1996. The impacts 
of the introduction of stock options on the underlying covered warrants are expressed 
in terms of warrants' retum, volatility, turnover (liquidity), and bid-ask spreads. 
We find that the introduction of stock options does not have significant 
impacts on the underlying covered warrants market as a whole, despite the retum 
level, volatility and liquidity all increase a little bit. However, the impacts on 
individual covered warrants are far from consistent. The introduction of stock options 
could either increase or decrease the volatility and liquidity of individual warrants, or 
in some cases have no influence at all. 
This result is contrary to the US experience where the warrants market 
gradually shrinks after the inception of stock options. Theories about market micro-
structure suggested by literature cannot fully explain this result. It has been doubted 
that switching of investors from the warrants market to the stock options market might 
be the main reason for the changes. However, by classifying the warrants into sub-
groups and running the spread decomposition model, we do not find strong evidence 
of switching of investors. Rather we find that the special market situation in Hong 
Kong might be responsible for this divergent changing patterns. The special market 
situation refers to: 
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1) Composition ofretail and institutional investors in the warrants market. 
Individual investors are assumed to be unable or reluctant to switch to the 
newly introduced stock options market, due to either the lack of expertise 
or their preferences for medium to long term investments. If the trading in 
the warrants market is mainly from individual investors, the market would 
not change significantly after the stock options listing. Otherwise, the 
market will fluctuate greatly; 
2) Mixture of trading activities in the warrants market. Individual and 
institutional investors have different purposes in trading warrants, such as 
hedging, speculation or pure investment . Some warrants might be 
advantageous for hedging and speculation, while others are good for long 
term investments. If trading in certain warrant mainly consists of hedging 
and speculations, this warrant would be more sensitive to the introduction 
of stock options. Consequently, both liquidity and volatility will be 
affected significantly. 
3) Divergent changes in the underlying stocks market. As a derivative 
instrument, covered warrant's performance is closely connected to the 
situation of the underlying stocks market. Both literature and some 
preliminary researches about Hong Kong market have suggested that 
stocks do not respond to the inception of stock options consistently. 
Therefore one cannot expect consistent responses from the warrants 
market. 
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In addition, some other factors like underlying company, issuer, maturity date 
and price status of individual warrant might also contribute to the changes of the 
covered warrants market. Nevertheless, the relations of these factors to the changes 
are not very obvious in our sample. 
Although the stock options have a strong debut in Hong Kong, it is still at its 
initial stage. Their impacts on the warrants market might not be fully observed at this 
moment. Nevertheless, based on our findings, we can foresee that the warrants market 
in Hong Kong will continue to be active, at least in the near future. The stock options 
will gain popularity only if individual investors start to trade these new instruments 
and brokers are enthusiastic in promoting them. 
58 
X. LIMITATIONS 
As a preliminary research, our study inevitably suffers from some limitations. 
Some of the limitations prevent us from reaching at definite conclusions, others might 
bias our research result. 
Limited Trading Days: As most of the covered warrants mature at late 1995 
and early 1996, only data in a short period (from the end of 1995 to February 1996) is 
eligible for our analysis. The small sample size decreases the significance of the 
results and no long term effect can be examined. Besides, the limited trading days of 
some warrantsii hinder us from setting up event windows. The possible noise trading 
around the introduction dates might bias our research results. 
Close stock option listing dates: All the nine stock options were issued 
between Sept. 9, 1995 and Dec. 18, 1995, i.e. only a bit more than two months or 40 
trading days. It is nearly impossible to control the impact of one company's stock 
option listing on the other companies' covered warrants. 
“N/A’，Data : Some of the trading data including daily bid prices, daily ask 
prices, daily closing prices and/or daily trading volume are missing in the Daily 
Quotation of Hong Kong Stock Exchange due to information hiding and/or 
recording/printing mistakes. This is especially the case when warrants approaching 
their maturity date. Therefore we can not have a 100% correct variance and/or mean 
calculation. 
11 Eligible trading days of our sample warrants range from 20 to 150 days. 
59 
No Data from Options and Underlving Stocks Market: Currently, we only 
work on the warrant market. Without examining the corresponding stock options and 
stocks markets simultaneously, no definite conclusion can be made. 
Small Sample Size : Only 22 out of 82 covered warrants are eligible for this 
research. The capitalization of these covered warrants is less than 50% of the total 
capitalization of the covered warrants market at any time in our test period. Therefore, 




The limitations mentioned above renders our research preliminary. It is 
certainly inadequate to describe the impact of stock options listing on the covered 
warrants market only in terms of changes of micro-structural variables. Besides, as a 
derivative instruments market, the warrants market is closely related to the underlying 
stock market as well as its competitor, the stock options market. It is thus very 
necessary to examine the change of interactions among these markets. These efforts 
could help not only to understand some of the contradictory results in our research, 
and also to capture the whole picture of the covered warrants market. The followings 
are several possible directions on which later researches could work: 
• Use data of longer period to examine whether the stock options have 
permanent orjust temporary impact on the covered warrants market; 
• Study the lead-lag relationship among stocks, warrants and stock options 
markets so as to examine changes of informational efficiency of these 
markets; 
• Control the influence of trading in stock options market in all tests so as to 
obtain clearer evidence about the impact of stock options on the covered 
warrants market; 
• Relate the changes in the covered warrants market to that in the underlying 
stocks market after the introduction of stock options. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1. Listing dates of stock options in SEHK 
Table 7 Listing dates of stock options in SEHK 






"SPA 95-10-23 — 
"CLP 95-10-23 — 
HL " ^ 1 2 - 1 8 — 
"HWL 95-12-18 
~SUK 95-12-18 — 
Appendix 2. Information about warrants in this study 
Table 8 Brokers of the cover warrants 
Brokers Abbreviations 
Bankers Trust Int'l plc BT 
Barclays de Zoete Wedd BZW 
Carr Indosuez Asia (Derivatives) Ltd. CARR 
Credit Lyonnais Finance (Guernsey) Ltd. ^ 
Merill Lynch Int, 1 & Co. ML “ 
Morgan Stanley (Jersey) Ltd. Morgan 
Peregrine Derivatives Ltd. Pereder 
Robert Flemings & Co., Ltd. RFlem 
S. G. Warburg OTC plc SGWar 
Swiss Bank Corporation Swiss 
Union Bank of Switzerland UBS 
Table 9 Underlying companies of the covered warrants. 
Companies Code in SEHK Abbreviation 
CITIC Pacific Ltd. 267 — CITIC 
Cheung Kong (Holdings) Ltd. — 1 CK 
China Light and Power Co., Ltd. 2 CLP — 
Hong Kong Telecommunications Ltd. 8 HKT 
Henderson Land Development Co., Ltd. — 12 ^ 
HSBC Holdings plc. 5 HSBC — 
Hutchison Whampoa Ltd. 13 HWL — 
Sun Hung Kai & Co., Ltd. ~ 86 SHK 
Swire Pacific Ltd. "A" 19 SPA 
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Table 10 Information of covered warrants in this research 
Code in Covered |Broker Start Date ” E n d Date~~ Strike Price 
SEHK Warrants (YY/MM/PP) (YY/MM/DD) (HK$) 
— 424 HSBC96 BZW 一 94/03/10— 96/01/31 120.000 
— 427 CLP96 ~ B T 95/06/15— 96/08/16 34.000 
— 515HSBC96 Swiss 95/06/15— 96/06/21 8 8 ^ 
“ 548 aTiC96 Morgan — 95/06/51 ~ 96/06/27 16.450 
“ 591 CITIC96 UBS 95/09/14 96/11/22~ 17.750 
“ 630 hTSBC96 一 Pereder 94/02/23 96/01/17 109.000 
631 SPA96 —R F I e m 94/02/18 97/02/20 62.000 
“ 678 CLP97 Swiss 95/09/11 — 97/01/16 32.640 
682 HSBC96 RFIem 94/03/03~ 96/02/02 131.000 
702 hTKT96 BT 95/Q8/3l~ 96/11/11 11.305 
• 725 HWL96 UBS 95/04/^~ 96/03/28 26.100 
761 HWL96 — CL 9 5 / 0 4 / ^ l ~ 96/06/28 26.860 
909 SHK96 —Pereder — 95/04/06 96/06/27 46.000 
913 HWL97 Pereder 95/06/01 ~~97/04/29 — 32.000 
915HL96 —Morgan 95/08/rT" 96/10/30 41.130 
1099 CLP96 S.G. W a r ~ 94/06/27 96/01/02 41.000 
1109 CK96 CL — 94/07/01 96/01/15 37.750 
1115 HSBC95 — M L — 94/04/27 95/12/08 87.000 
‘ 1165 ClTiC96 S.G.War 94/09/09— 96/02/12~ 22.600 
1176SPA96 Pereder 95/03/01 ~96/03/28 — 40.000 
1195 SHK96 CARR 一 94/10/27 96/03/29 56.000 
1225CK97 Morgan 94/07/06 ~97/02/10 — 27.450 
1226 HSBC97 |Morgan 95/03/13 97/02/10 72.450 
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Appendix 3. Statistical results 
Table 11 Statistical results from return test 
Return Return Return Return Return Return Return Return 
Mean Mean Mean Mean Std. Dev Std. Dev Std. Dev Variance 
Before After Change TTest Before After Change FTest 
ciric 
^ 0.0073 ~~0.0099 ~~0^477 ~"0.6747 ~ 0 . 0 3 6 2 ~~0.0364 ~ 0 . 0 0 6 0 ~ 0 . 9 5 9 9 
^ 0.0111 ~ 0 . 0 0 5 3 “ -0 .5218 ~~0.6674 ~ 0 . 0 4 8 0 ~ 0 . 0 3 4 1 “ -0 .2900 ~ 0 . 1 4 7 6 
r m -0.0123 0.1563 -13.6532 ~ O l ^ ~ 0 . 1 4 7 6 ~ 0 . 3 0 9 4 ~ 1 . 0 9 6 6 ~"0.9790 
^ 
T m 0.0003 ~~0.0158 60.1291 ~ 0 . 1 2 1 5 ~ 0 . 0 4 9 4 ~ 0 . 0 5 6 5 ~ 0 . 1 4 3 4 ~~0.3189 
1 ^ 0.0025 ~~0.0090 ~ 2 . 5 9 8 0 ~ 0 . 3 6 4 8 ~ 0 . 0 2 8 2 ~"0.0607 ~ 1 . 1 5 4 7 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 
^ 
4^7 -0.0051 ~ 0 . 0 0 9 0 -2.7846 ~ 0 . 5 3 1 7 ~~0.0764 ~ 0 . 1 2 9 8 ~ 0 . 6 9 8 7 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 6 
678 -0.0094 ~ 0 . 0 0 1 9 -1.2031 ~ 0 . 4 5 0 6 ~ 0 . 0 5 9 5 ~ 0 . 0 4 6 6 -0.2165 ~~0.2294 
Hia 
702 0.0010 -0.0009 “ -1 .9399 ~~0.8421 ~ 0 . 0 3 2 6 ~ 0 . 0 3 8 4 ~ 0 . 1 7 9 9 ~"0.4019 
HL 
9T5 0.0008 ~ 0 . 0 1 8 2 21.7824 ~~~0.0447 ~ 0 . 0 4 0 5 ~ 0 . 0 3 6 8 -0.0903 ~~"0.5523 
HSBC 
^ 0.0063 ~ 0 . 0 5 5 4 ~ 7 . 7 8 7 3 ~~~0.3317 ~ 0 . 0 8 6 0 ~ 0 . 4 3 5 9 """4.0687 ~~0.0000 
^ O m U ~ 0 M ^ """4.0704 ~~0.4967 """0.0333 ~~0.0234 -0.2957 ~ 0 . 0 2 9 9 
630 0.0029 “ -0 .0011 “ -1 .3920 ~~0.7505 ~ 0 . 0 5 8 9 ~ 0 . 0 8 6 9 ~~0.4753 ~ 0 . 0 0 1 6 
^ -0.0025 -0.0035 ~~0.4198 ~ 0 . 9 7 5 1 "““0.0728 ~ 0 . 2 7 4 8 “2.7754 ~~0.0000 
TTTS 0.0027 ~~0.0078 ~~1.9444 ~~0.5199 ~ 0 . 0 3 7 7 ~ 0 . 0 3 8 0 “ “0 .0082 ~~~0.9573 
T ^ 0.0156 ~~0.0039 ~-0.7509 ~~~0.4604 ~~0.2135 ~~~0.0220 ““-0.8969 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 
H ^ 
7I5 0.0069 ~~0.0068 “ -0 .0253 ~~~0.9798 ~~~0.0251 ~ 0 . 0 3 5 7 ~~0.4216 ~ 0 . 0 3 0 7 
76^ 0.0076 - ~ 0 . 0 0 6 1 ““-0.1936 ~ 0 . 8 3 2 0 ~ 0 . 0 2 3 9 ~~0.0372 ~ 0 . 5 5 2 3 ~ 0 . 0 0 6 5 
gTs 0.0088 ~ 0 . 0 0 6 1 ~"-0.3016 ~~0.7045 ~ 0 . 0 2 7 5 ~~0.0365 ~ 0 . 3 2 9 2 “ “0 .0686 
SHK 
909 0.0040 ~~~0.0109 ~ 1 . 7 5 0 5 ~~~0.4109 ~ 0 . 0 3 4 7 ~~0.0395 ~~0.1379 “ “0 .4296 
TTiS -0.0013 ~~0.0192 -15.9109 ~ 0 . 1 4 5 1 ~ 0 . 0 5 8 7 ~~0.0697 ~~~0.1873 ~~0.2698 
SPA 
^ -0.0012 ~~0.0508 -41.7589 “ “0 .4105 ~~0.0546 “ “0 .4215 “ “6 .7256 ~~0.0000 
Tr76 -0.0002 ~~0.0073 -30.6862 ~~~0.2094 ~ 0 . 0 2 9 3 ~ 0 . 0 3 6 9 ~~0.2601 ~ 0 . 0 7 3 4 
Average 0.0021 ~~0.0182 -0.4678 0.5049 ~~0.0579 ~"0.1049 “ “0 .7923 ~~0.2480 
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Table 12 Statistical results from turnover test (raw data) 
Raw Data Turnover Turnover Turnover Turnover Turnover Turnover Turnover Turnover 
Mean Mean Mean Mean Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Variance 
B e f o r e “ After Change TTest Before After Change FTest 
cPfic 
^ 4757083 2187083 -0.5402 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 5 5606927 2162040 -0.6144 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 
^ 5403500 ~~954500 “ - 0 . 8 2 3 4 ~~0.0000 3184339 “ 9 8 2 8 1 3 “ - 0 . 6 9 1 4 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 
T T ^ 213333 “ 1 5 5 0 0 0 “ - 0 . 2 7 3 4 ~ 0 . 4 4 1 1 “ 1 0 0 5 3 2 “ 1 9 0 9 1 9 ~ 0 . 8 9 9 1 ~ 0 . 0 8 0 2 
^R 
T 1 ^ 13657544 16151053 ~ 0 . 1 8 2 6 ~ 0 . 2 6 3 1 13600080 9742730 ~~-0.2836 ~ 0 . 0 1 3 8 
T ^ 3226632 2614828 -0.1896 ~ 0 . 1 1 3 6 3137988 1730458 ““-0.4485 ~~0.0000 
CLP 
^ 2222667 3263556 ~ 0 . 4 6 8 3 ~ 0 . 0 7 4 2 2446031 2989424 ~~0.2222 ~ 0 . 1 8 7 2 
^ 318077 “ 4 2 4 6 1 5 ~ 0 . 3 3 4 9 ~ 0 . 4 1 6 0 “ 3 8 2 3 5 3 “ 5 4 0 0 2 2 ~~0.4124 ~ 0 . 0 9 0 5 
HKT 
702 9485000 3564429 “ - 0 . 6 2 4 2 ~ 0 . 0 0 3 2 9397568 2818242 “ - 0 . 7 0 0 1 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 
HL 
9^5 1440732 2672927 ~~0.8553 “ “ 0 . 0 1 3 2 1991991 2389263 ~~0.1994 ~~0.2543 
HSBC 
^ 9482410 21657442 ~ 1 . 2 8 4 0 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 11282521 17442631 ~ 0 . 5 4 6 0 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 2 
^ 336927 1154049 ~~2.4252 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 ~~471759 “ 6 9 1 2 2 3 ~ 0 . 4 6 5 2 ~ 0 . 0 1 7 7 
630 8616768 18772841 ~ 1 . 1 7 8 6 “ “ 0 .0000 10191033 13683558 ~ 0 . 3 4 2 7 ~~0.0162 
^ 9749562 7698877 ~-0.2103 ~ 0 . 2 2 9 5 11339370 9061083 ““-0.2009 ~ 0 . 0 5 8 9 
T r i 5 3932889 3111600 ““-0.2088 ~~~0.1330 2367982 2754697 ~ 0 . 1 6 3 3 ~~0.3193 
T I ^ 471078 “ 4 1 7 4 9 7 “ - 0 . 1 1 3 7 ~ 0 . 1 1 9 8 ” 4 7 3 1 6 0 “ 4 0 0 6 5 4 ~~-0.1532 ~~~0.0057 
HWL 
7 ^ 901250 ~~937875 ~ 0 . 0 4 0 6 ~~~0.8935 1546082 ““759081 -0.5090 ~~~0.0000 
7 ^ 966341 1622683 ~~0.6792 0.0695 1201927 1935097 "““0.6100 ~ 0 . 0 0 3 3 
9^3 641163 3186744 “ “ 3 .9703 ~~0.0000 “ 5 8 6 4 3 1 3236388 ~ 4 . 5 1 8 8 “ “ 0 .0000 
SiHK 
909 469051 1804103 ~ 2 . 8 4 6 3 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 ““581987 1598560 ~~1.7467 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 
T ^ 5465814 19323485 ~ 2 . 5 3 5 3 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 4449445 11427138 ~ 1 . 5 6 8 2 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 
SPA 
631 13721522 23108478 ~ 0 . 6 8 4 1 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 4 10611807 13787469 ~~~0.2993 ~ 0 . 0 8 2 4 
Tl76 567097 ~621452 ~ 0 . 0 9 5 8 ~ 0 . 7 5 8 4 1205489 “ 6 8 7 2 8 6 ““-0.4299 ~~0.0000 
Average 4365747 6154778 "““0.6635 ~~~0.1604 4370764 4591399 “ “0 .3619 ~ 0 . 0 5 1 4 
« 
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Table 13 Statistical results from turnover test (Adjusted data) 
Adjusted Turnover Turnover Turnover Turnover Turnover Turnover Turnover Turnover 
Mean Mean Mean Mean Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Variance 
B e f o r e “ After Change TTest B e f o r e “ After Change FTest 
ciric 
548 0.3091 ~ 0 . 1 1 7 5 -0.6200 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 . 3 0 4 9 ~ 0 . 1 0 3 9 ~~-0.6593 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 
^ 0.3266 0.0716 -0.7807 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 ~~0.1543 ~ 0 . 0 6 7 2 “ - 0 . 5 6 4 3 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 7 
T T ^ 0.0103 ~~0 .0118 ~ 0 . 1 4 5 5 ~ 0 . 1 5 1 5 ~ 0 . 0 0 4 4 ~~0.0144 ~~2.3074 ~~0 .0024 
CK 
r i ^ 0.8268 ~ 1 . 2 1 8 0 ~ 0 . 4 7 3 0 ~~0.0017 """^0.6590 ~~~0.6382 ~~-0.0316 ~~0.8112 
T ^ 0.2075 ~ 0 . 1 6 1 8 “ -0 .2203 ~~~0.0434 ~~0.1687 ~~0.1239 ~-0.2660 ~ 0 . 0 0 4 5 
^ 
4 ^ 0.1796 ~ 0 . 1 4 8 0 “ -0 .1755 ~ 0 . 3 9 0 0 ~~0.2114 ~~0.1228 ~"-0.4192 ~~0.0005 
^ 0.0223 ~~0.0162 ~~-0.2731 ~~0.3159 ~~~0.0242 ~~0.0187 ~~-0.2263 ~ 0 . 2 0 6 6 
Wf 
702 0.5633 ~~0.2809 -0.5013 ~ 0 . 0 0 6 0 ~ 0 . 4 6 9 1 ~ 0 . 2 0 7 2 ~"-0.5583 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 1 
HL 
^ 0.0998 ~~0.1079 ~ 0 . 0 8 1 0 ~~0.7271 ~ 0 . 1 2 6 8 ~ 0 . 0 7 5 8 ” -0 .4020 ~ 0 . 0 0 1 6 
HSBC 
4 ¾ 0.6283 ~ 1 . 4 6 7 8 ~~1.3362 ~~0.0000 ~~0.7151 ~ 1 . 1 4 8 1 ~ 0 . 6 0 5 5 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 
5?5 0.0216 ~~0.0783 ~ 2 . 6 3 2 6 ~~0.0000 ~~~0.0266 ~ 0 . 0 3 8 9 ~~0.4644 ~ 0 . 0 1 7 8 
6 ^ 0.5512，~~1.4014 ~~"1.5426 ~~0.0000 ~~0.5289 ~~1.0863 ~1.0537 ~"0.0000 
^ 0.6978 ~~0.4542 “ - 0 . 3 4 9 0 ~~"0.0247 ~ " 0 . 8 4 1 3 ~ 0 . 3 5 3 0 ~ - 0 . 5 8 0 4 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 
TTTs 0.2740 ~ 0 . 1 9 6 4 “ -0 .2834 ~ 0 . 0 0 7 8 ~ 0 . 1 4 3 8 ~~0.1260 “ -0 .1233 ~~~0.3860 
T ^ 0.0287 ~ 0 . 0 2 3 0 ~~-0.1978 ~ 0 . 0 0 1 6 ~~~0.0248 ~ 0 . 0 2 1 2 ~~-0.1453 ~ 0 . 0 2 1 0 
HWL 
7^5 0.0522 ~ 0 . 0 3 9 8 ~~-0.2375 ~ 0 . 2 9 0 8 ~~~0.0681 ~~0.0276 ~-0.5942 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 
7 ^ 0.0616 ~~0.0650 ~~0.0558 ~~0.8221 ~ 0 . 0 7 4 1 ~ 0 . 0 6 3 4 ~~-0.1443 ~ 0 . 3 2 8 4 
9^3 0.0446 ~~~0.1324 ~~1.9675 ~~"0.0000 ~~0.0395 ~~0.1099 ~ 1 . 7 8 5 1 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 
SHK 
^ 0.0287 ~ 0 . 0 7 0 5 ~ 1 . 4 5 8 9 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 ~~0.0308 ""^0.0513 ~"0.6676 ~~~0.0022 
TT95 0.4055 ~ 0 . 8 5 1 4 ~ 1 . 0 9 9 4 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 ~~0.3178 ~ 0 . 4 3 2 2 ~ 0 . 3 6 0 0 ~~0.0493 
S ^ 
^ 0.9105 ~~1.7776 ~~~0.9524 ~~0.0000 ~~0.6432 ~ 1 . 0 6 9 7 ~~0.6631 ~~0.0009 
TT76 0.0365 0.0280 “ -0 .2338 ~ 0 . 4 2 0 0 ~ 0 . 0 7 8 8 ~ 0 . 0 2 5 8 -0.6732 ~~0.0000 
Average 0.2858 ~ 0 . 3 9 6 3 ~ 0 . 3 5 7 8 ~ 0 . 1 4 5 6 ~~~0.2571 ~~0.2693 ~ 0 . 1 1 4 5 ~~0.0833 
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Table 14 Statistical results from spread test (Raw data) 
Raw Data Spread"~ Spread~" S p r e a d ~ S p r e a d “ Sp read~ Spread Spread Spread 
Mean Mean Mean Means~~ Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Variance 
B e f o r e “ A f t e r Change TTest B e f o r e ~ A f t e r Change FTest 
ciric 
^ 0.0117 ~ 0 . 0 1 8 2 ~~~0.5595 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 . 0 0 3 8 ~ 0 . 0 1 2 4 ~ 2 . 2 9 6 3 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 
^ 0.0120 ~ 0 . 0 1 6 5 ~ 0 . 3 7 5 0 ~~~0.1447 ~"0.0041 ~~"0.0127 ~~"2.0898 ~~~0.0000 
T T ^ 0.0292 ~"0.0175 “ -0 .4000 ~~~0.4169 ~~0.0092 ~ 0 . 0 0 3 5 “ -0 .6146 ~ 0 . 3 7 3 2 
^R 
TT09 0.0092 ~~0.0112 ~ 0 . 2 1 9 0 ~ 0 . 0 0 7 7 ~ 0 . 0 0 3 1 ~ 0 . 0 0 4 7 ~ 0 . 5 0 0 1 ~ 0 . 0 0 2 9 
T ^ 0.0155 " "0 .0236 ~~0.5185 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 . 0 0 8 2 ~ 0 . 0 1 3 4 ~ 0 . 6 4 4 0 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 
^ 
4 ^ 0.0162 ~ 0 . 0 1 2 4 -0.2329 ~ 0 . 0 1 6 9 ~ 0 . 0 0 9 4 ~~0.0043 ~~-0.5358 ~~~0.0000 
678 0.0262 ~ 0 . 0 2 9 6 ~ 0 . 1 3 2 4 ~ 0 . 4 2 2 7 ~ 0 . 0 1 4 2 ~ 0 . 0 1 6 6 ~ 0 . 1 7 2 6 ~~0.4315 
HKT 
7 ^ 0.0055 ~~0.0071 ~~0.2903 ~ 0 . 0 1 2 7 ~ 0 . 0 0 1 6 ~~0.0029 ~ 0 . 8 1 8 4 ~ 0 . 0 0 2 8 
HL 
9T5 0.0251 ~ 0 . 0 2 0 0 ~~-0.2039 ~~0.0774 ~~0.0145 ~ 0 . 0 1 1 2 “ -0 .2296 ~ 0 . 1 0 3 0 
HSBC 
^ 0.0079 ~~0 .0055 “ - 0 . 3 0 6 5 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 1 ~ 0 . 0 0 3 5 ~~0 .0040 ~ 0 . 1 4 0 8 ~~0 .2498 
^ 0.0683 ~ 0 . 0 3 6 0 ~~-0.4732 ~~0.0001 ~~"0.0458 ~ 0 . 0 1 5 9 ~-0.6535 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 
^ 0.0122 ~~0 .0114 “ - 0 . 0 5 9 5 ~~~0.3524 ~~0 .0048 ~~0 .0043 ~~-0.1070 ~ 0 . 3 5 2 9 
^ 0.0053 ~~~0.0035 “ - 0 . 3 4 0 3 ~ 0 . 0 0 1 0 ~ 0 . 0 0 3 9 ~~0 .0024 “ - 0 . 3 9 1 6 ~~0.0000 
TTfs 0.0182 ~ 0 . 0 3 5 0 ~~0.9207 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 ~~0.0097 ~ 0 . 0 2 0 2 ~~1.0933 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 
T I ^ 0.0557 ~ 0 . 0 6 4 2 ~~"0.1527 ~~0.0009 ~~0.0351 ~ 0 . 0 3 6 0 ~~0.0263 ~~~0.2765 
HWL 
7 ^ 0.0377 - ”0 .0518 ~~0.3727 ~~0.0171 ~ 0 . 0 2 6 4 ~~0.0251 ~~~-0.0494 ~ 0 . 7 5 3 4 
7 ^ 0.0244 ~ 0 . 0 6 5 6 ~~~1.6900 ~"0.1067 ~"0.0204 ~ 0 . 1 5 8 7 ~ 6 . 7 8 8 9 ~"0.0000 
9T3 0.0314 ~ 0 . 0 2 8 0 “ -0 .1074 ~ 0 . 3 5 1 1 ~~~0.0195 ~ 0 . 0 1 3 3 “ -0 .3178 ~~0.0149 
SHK 
909 0.0369 ~~0.0341 ” -0 .0764 ~~0.6074 ~ 0 . 0 2 1 7 ~~0.0264 ~~0.2178 """0.2290 
TT95 0.0135 ~ 0 . 0 1 0 9 “ -0 .1897 ~"0.0164 ~~0.0061 ~ 0 . 0 0 2 9 “ -0 .5203 """0.0000 
S ^ 
^ 0.0082 ~~0.0037 ~~-0.5413 ~~0.0000 ~~0.0046 ~ 0 . 0 0 2 7 “ -0 .4260 ~~0.0003 
T r ^ 0.0436 ~ 0 . 0 5 6 7 ~~~0.2994 ~~0.0121 ~~~0.0268 ~~0.0302 ~ 0 . 1 2 4 1 ~ 0 . 3 6 3 4 
Average 0.0234 ~~0.0256 ~ 0 . 1 1 8 1 ~ 0 . 1 1 6 6 ~ 0 . 0 1 3 5 " "0 .0193 ~"0.5030 ~ 0 . 1 4 3 3 
• 
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Table 15 Statistical results from spread test (Adjusted data) 
Adjusted |Spread~~|Spread“ S p r e a d “ S p r e a d “ S p r e a d “ Spread Spread Spread 
Mean Mean Mean M e a n s ~ Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Variance 
Before~~ After Change TTest B e f o r e ~ After Change FTest 
ciric 
^ 1.8830 ~ 1 . 6 8 0 0 ~-0 .1078 ~~0.1251 ~~0.6397 ~~0.9139 ~ 0 . 4 2 8 8 ~ 0 . 0 0 3 0 
^ 1.7924 ~~2.4249 ~ 0 . 3 5 2 9 """0.1834 ~"0.6784 ~ 1 . 9 4 9 0 ~ 1 . 8 7 3 1 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 
V m 8.9210 ~~5.2523 -0.4112 ~~0.5179 ~ 2 . 5 8 0 6 ~ 0 . 0 8 1 3 -0.9685 ~~0.1504 ^R 
V ^ 1.6656 ~ 1 . 6 1 0 7 “ - 0 . 0 3 3 0 ~ 0 . 5 3 4 9 ~~~0.5242 ~ 0 . 4 1 0 6 “ - 0 . 2 1 6 7 ~ 0 . 0 7 0 2 
T ^ 1.0894 -~~1.0711 -0.0168 ~ 0 . 8 3 2 0 ~~0.6072 ~~0.5256 ~~-0.1343 ~ 0 . 1 8 3 0 
cHp — 
4 ^ 1.9291 ~~1.6694 “ - 0 . 1 3 4 6 ~~~0.1011 ~ 0 . 8 7 9 4 ~~0.5728 ~-0 .3486 ~ 0 . 0 0 5 3 
678 2.8720 ~ 3 . 3 1 0 2 ~~0.1526 ~ 0 . 3 9 0 9 ~~1.7409 ~~1.9062 ~ 0 . 0 9 4 9 ~~0.6536 
HKT — 
702 1.4057 ~~2.3027 ~ 0 . 6 3 8 1 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 1 ~~0.4117 ~~0.9641 ~ 1 . 3 4 2 0 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 
HL -
9T5 2.8412 ~~"1.4342 “ - 0 . 4 9 5 2 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 ~~1.7749 ~ 0 . 7 3 5 7 ~-0.5855 ~~0.0000 
HSBC ! ^ Z ^ Z Z ^ ^ 
4 ¾ ^807? ~ r 7 9 T 9 -0.0084 ~~0.9296 ~ 0 . 9 6 2 0 ~ 1 . 1 8 1 4 ~ 0 . 2 2 8 1 """0.0733 
^ 3.0031 ~ ~ T 3 ^ -0.5448 ~~0.0000 ~ 2 . 1 2 8 7 ~~0.5762 -0.7293 ~~0.0000 
6 ^ 1.3558 ~"1.4751 ~"0.0880 ~~0.2557 ~ 0 . 5 8 9 8 ~~0.6366 ~ 0 . 0 7 9 3 ~ 0 . 5 3 0 9 
^ 2.1152 ~~6.7924 ~ 2 . 2 1 1 2 ~~0.0000 ~"1.6066 ~"6.6848 ~ 3 . 1 6 0 8 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 
T r i 5 0.9298 ~~1.4719 ~ 0 . 5 8 3 0 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 3 ~~0.4616 ~~0.8213 ~ 0 . 7 7 9 2 ~"0.0002 
T ^ 0 ^ ~ T 3 S ~ 0 . 0 1 2 5 ~ 0 . 8 2 8 2 ~ 0 . 7 9 8 1 ~^0.7045 -0.1174 ~"0.0271 
HWL 
7 ^ 2.3021 ~ 2 . 2 6 3 2 ” - 0 . 0 1 6 9 ~~~0.9008 ~~~1.6136 ~ 1 . 1 2 3 4 ~~-0.3038 ~ 0 . 0 2 6 2 
76l T;50TT ~~2.6499 ~ 0 ? 7 ^ ~ 0 . 2 0 9 5 ~ 1 . 2 3 6 5 ~~5.6414 ~ 3 . 5 6 2 5 ~"0.0000 
9 ^ 2.2953 ~ 1 . 3 5 9 1 ~~-0.4079 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 2 ~ 1 . 4 3 7 1 ~~0.6390 “ - 0 . 5 5 5 3 ~~0.0000 
SHK z z z z z z z z z 
909 Z 2 3 ^ 1.5006 -0.3291 ~~o3TTT"""1.3725 ~~1.1070 -0.1934 0.1897 
T T ^ 1.6821 ~ 0 . 9 4 3 4 ~~-0.4391 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 ~~0.9263 ~~0.3326 ~~-0.6409 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 
S ^ ~~ 
63^ T ^ e ^ ~~4.5793 ~~TJ748 ~ a 0 0 0 4 ~~0.8412 ~"5.1117 ~ 5 . 0 7 6 5 ~ 0 . 0 0 0 0 
T ^ 1.9756 ~ 2 . 4 9 0 3 ~~0.2605 ~ 0 . 0 2 5 3 ~ 1 . 2 2 8 2 ~~1.3015 ~ 0 . 0 5 9 6 ~ 0 . 6 5 2 4 
Average Z 2 0 ^ ~ 2 . 3 0 8 3 ~ ~ M 7 7 0 ~ " 0 2 ^ ~~1.1381 ~ 1 . 5 4 1 8 ~~0.5405 ~~0.1166 
• 
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Appendix 4. Changes ofwarrants around the introduction of stock options 
sorted on various dimensions 
Table 16 Raw data statistical results in company classification 
Raw Spread Spread Spread Spread Turn-"""Turn-~~Turn-~~Turn- Return Return Return Return 
Data over over over over 
Mean Mean Std. Vari- Mean Mean Std. Varl- Mean Mean Std. Vari-
Dev. ance Dev. ance Dev ance 
Change TTest Change FTest Change TTest Change FTest Change TTest Change FTest 
ciric 
548 + Sig. + Sig. - Sig. - Sig. + lnsig. + lnsig. 
591 + lnsig. + Sig. - Sig. - Sig. - lnsig. - lnsig. 
1165 - lnsig. - lnsig. - lnsig. + lnsig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
CK 
1109 + Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. - Sig. + lnsig. + lnsig. 
1225 + Sig. + Sig. - lnsig. - Sig. + lnsig. + Sig. 
CLP 
427 - Sig. - Sig. + lnsig. + lnsig. - lnsig. + Sig. 
678 + lnsig. + lnsig. + lnsig. + lnsig. - lnsig. - lnsig. 
HKT 
702 + Sig. + Sig. - Sig. - Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
HL 
9 1 5 - lnsig. - lnsig. + Sig. + lnsig. + lnsig. - lnsig. 
HSBC 
424 - Sig. + lnsig. + Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. + Sig. 
515 - Sig. - Sig. + Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. - lnsig. 
630 - lnsig. - lnsig. + Sig. + Sig. - lnsig. + Sig. 
682 - Sig. - Sig. - lnsig. - lnsig. + lnsig. + Sig. 
1115 + Sig. + Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. + lnsig. + lnsig. 
1226 + Sig. + lnsig. - lnsig. - Sig. - lnsig. - Sig. 
HWL 
725 + Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. - Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
761 + lnsig. + Sig. + lnsig. + Sig. - lnsig. + Sig. 
9 1 3 - lnsig. - Sig. + Sig. + Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
SHK 
909 - lnsig. + lnsig. + Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. + lnsig. 
1195 - Sig. - Sig. + Sig. + Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
SPA 
631 - Sig. - Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. - lnsig. + Sig. 
1176 + Sig. + lnsig. + lnsig. - Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
^y^ra- * !nslg. + tnsigT" + insig. + lnsig. - fnsig. + lnsig 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 1 ^麵 ^ 1 1 ? ^丨 : 4歉微 1〜力弥 - _、举零御 - r ^ m . ^ ¾ ¾ ^ ^ ^ ^ ¾ ^ : ：^ 
4 
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Table 17 Adjusted data statistical results in company classification 
Adjust- Spread Spread Spread Spread Turn-~""Turn-~""Turn-~Turn Return Return Return Return 
ed over over over over 
Mean Mean Std. Vari- Mean Mean Std. Varl- Mean Mean Std. Vari-
Dev. ance Dev. ance Dev. ance 
Change TTest Change FTest Change TTest Change FTest Change TTest Change FTest 
CITIC 
548 - lnsig. + Sig. - Sig. - Sig. + lnsig. + lnsig. 
591 + lnsig. + Sig. - Sig. - Sig. - lnsig. - lnsig. 
1165 - lnsig. - lnsig. + lnsig. + Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
CK 
1109 - lnsig. - lnsig. + Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. + lnsig. 
1225 - lnsig. - lnsig. - lnsig. - Sig. + lnsig. + Sig. 
CLP 
427 - lnsig. - Sig. - lnsig. - Sig. - lnsig. + Sig. 
678 + lnsig. + lnsig. - lnsig. - lnsig. - lnsig. - lnsig. 
HKT 
702 + Sig. + Sig. - Sig. - Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
HL 
915 - Sig. - Sig. + lnsig. - Sig. + lnsig. - lnsig. 
HSBC 
424 - lnsig. + lnsig. + Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. + Sig. 
515 - Sig. - Sig. + Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. - lnsig. 
630 + lnsig. + lnsig. + Sig. + Sig. - lnsig. + Sig. 
682 + Sig. + Sig. - Sig. - Sig. + lnsig. + Sig. 
1115 + Sig. + Sig. - Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. + lnsig. 
1226 + lnsig. - lnsig. - Sig. - Sig. - lnsig. - Sig. 
HWL 
725 - insig. - lnsig. - lnsig. - Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
761 + lnsig. + Sig. + lnsig. - lnsig. - lnsig. + Sig. 
913 - Sig. - Sig. + Sig. + Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
SHK 
909 - lnsig. - lnsig. + Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. + lnsig. 
1195 _ Sig. - Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
SPA 
631 + lnsig. + Sig. + Sig. + Sig. - lnsig. + Sig. 
1176 + Sig. + lnsig. - lnsig. - Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
A ^ ^ • [Hi^  + i n^ • insig； • U^. - fi^ • insig™ 
|^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ |^| ^^^^^^ M^iaiMriBMtliSi**<<***"^****^*^*************************************************** U^m||mmjm|jjm|||ymyjjyj|y|||^|yj|Uj|y||jj||^yy|||||||||||^||||ygmJmj||ggjg||^||mjmjgm|^yg^ gmj|m|mmjj^gj|^gjjjj|jj^J|mj|jjjj^|jjjj|mj^jjj|^g^jgg^gjjmmm|jjm^^||^|^|||||||||y|||mmHjj^|||y|^|||^ 
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Table 18 Raw data statistical results in broker classification 
Raw Spread Spread Spread Spread Turn-~~Turn-~"Turn-~""Turn- Return Return Return Return 
Data over over over over 
Mean Mean Std. Varl- Mean Mean Std. Vari- Mean Mean Std. Vari-
Dev. ance Dev. ance Dev ance 
Change TTest Change FTest Change TTest Change FTest Change TTest Change FTest 
BT 
427 - Sig. - Sig. + lnsig. + lnsig. - lnsig. + Sig. 
702 + Sig. + Sig. - Sig. - Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
BZW 
424 - Sig. + lnsig. + Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. + Sig. 
CARR 
1195 - Sig. - Sig. + Sig. + Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
CL 
1109 + Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. - Sig. + lnsig. + lnsig. 
761 + lnsig. + Sig. + lnsig. + Sig. - lnsig. + Sig. 
ML 
1 1 1 5 + Sig. + Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. + lnsig. + lnsig. 
Morgan 
548 + Sig. + Sig. - Sig. - Sig. + lnsig. + lnsig. 
1225 + Sig. + Sig. _ lnsig. - Sig. + lnsig. + Sig. 
915 - lnsig. - lnsig. + Sig. + lnsig. + lnsig. - lnsig. 
1226 + Sig. + lnsig. - lnsig. - Sig. - lnsig. - Sig. 
Perede 
r 
630 - lnsig. - lnsig. + Sig. + Sig. - lnsig. + Sig. 
913 - lnsig. - Sig. + Sig. + Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
909 - lnsig. + lnsig. + Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. + lnsig. 
1 1 7 6 + Sig. + lnsig. + lnsig. - Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
RFIem 
682 - Sig. - Sig. - lnsig. - lnsig. + lnsig. + Sig. 
631 - Sig. - Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. - lnsig. + Sig. 
S.G. 
War 
1165 - lnsig. - lnsig. - lnsig. + lnsig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
Swiss 
678 + lnsig. + lnsig. + Insig. + lnsig. - lnsig. - lnsig. 
515 - Sig. - Sig. + Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. - lnsig. 
UBS 
591 + lnsig. + Sig. - Sig. - Sig. - lnsig. - lnsig. 
725 + Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. - Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
Avera- + insig! + fnsig, + lnsig. + lnsig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
ge , -^ ^^ ^^ -^=^ '^〈—^ -^ .•^ .:^ ::^ ^^ #::^ #^^ •^^ %赛^ ^^ :‘丨.:3辦,‘^ ^^『趟_##^ '^-_. 
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Table 19Adjusted data statistical results in broker classification 
Adjust- Spread Spread Spread Spread Turn-~~Turn-~""Turn-~~Turn- Return Return Return Return 
ed over over over over 
Mean Mean Std. Vari- Mean Mean Std. Vari- Mean Mean Std. Vari-
Dev. ance Dev. ance Dev. ance 
Change TTest Change FTest Change TTest Change FTest Change TTest Change FTest 
^ 
427 - lnsig. - Sig. - lnsig. - Sig. - lnsig. + Sig. 
702 + Sig. + Sig. - Sig. - Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
BZW 
424 - lnsig. + lnsig. + Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. + Sig. 
CARR 
1195 - Sig. - Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
CL 
1109 - lnsig. - lnsig. + Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. + lnsig. 
761 + lnsig. + Sig. + lnsig. - lnsig. - lnsig. + Sig. 
ML 
1115 + Sig. + Sig. - Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. + lnsig. 
Morgan 
548 - lnsig. + Sig. - Sig. - Sig. + lnsig. + lnsig. 
1225 - lnsig. - lnsig. - lnsig. - Sig. + lnsig. + Sig. 
915 - Sig. - Sig. + lnsig. - Sig. + lnsig. - lnsig. 
1226 + lnsig. - lnsig. - Sig. - Sig. - lnsig. - Sig. 
Perede 
r 
630 + lnsig. + lnsig. + Sig. + Sig. - lnsig. + Sig. 
9 1 3 - Sig. - Sig. + Sig. + Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
909 _ lnsig. - lnsig. + Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. + lnsig. 
1176 + Sig. + lnsig. - lnsig. - Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
RFIem 
682 + Sig. + Sig. - Sig. - Sig. + lnsig. + Sig. 
631 + Sig. + Sig. + Sig. + Sig. - lnsig. + Sig. 
S.G. 
War 
1165 • lnsig. - lnsig. + lnsig. + Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
Swiss 
678 + lnsig. + lnsig. - lnsig. - lnsig. - lnsig. - lnsig. 
515 - Sig. - Sig. + Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. - lnsig. 
UBS 
591 + lnsig. + Sig. - Sig. - Sig. - lnsig. - lnsig. 
725 - lnsig. - lnsig. - lnsig. - Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
S ^ 4 ^ ^ ~ ^ ^ + 丨"9.1 + 崎 + 丨 - | - _• + _ . | 
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Table 20 Raw data statistical results in maturity date classification 
Raw Spread Spread Spread Spread Turn-~~Turn-~~Turn-"""^Turn- Return Return Return Return 
Data over over over over 
Mean Mean Std. Vari- Mean Mean Std. Vari- Mean Mean Std. Vari-
Dev. ance Dev. ance Dev ance 
Change TTest Change FTest Change TTest Change FTest Change TTest Change FTest 
1115 + Sig! + Sig! - Insig. + Insig. + Insig. + Insig. 
1109 + Sig. + Sig. + Insig. - Sig. + Insig. + Insig. 
630 - Insig. - Insig. + Sig. + Sig. - Insig. + Sig. 
424 - Sig. + Insig. + Sig. + Sig. + Insig. + Sig. 
682 - Sig. - Sig. - Insig. - Insig. + Insig. + Sig. 
1165 - Insig. - Insig. - Insig. + Insig. - Insig. + Insig. 
1195 - Sig. - Sig. + Sig. + Sig. - Insig. + Insig. 
725 + Sig. - Insig. + Insig. - Sig. - Insig. + Insig. 
1176 + Sig. + Insig. + Insig. - Sig. - Insig. + Insig. 
515 - Sig. - Sig. + Sig. + Sig. + Insig. - Insig. 
548 + Sig. + Sig. - Sig. - Sig. + Insig. + Insig. 
909 - Insig. + Insig. + Sig. + Sig. + Insig. + Insig. 
427 - Sig. - Sig. + Insig. + Insig. - Insig. + Sig. 
915 - Insig. - Insig. + Sig. + Insig. + Insig. - Insig. 
702 + Sig. + Sig. - Sig. - Sig. - Insig. + Insig. 
591 + Insig. + Sig. - Sig. - Sig. - Insig. - Insig. 
761 + Insig. + Sig. + Insig. + Sig. - Insig. + Sig. 
678 + Insig. + Insig. + Insig. + Insig. - Insig. - Insig. 
1225 + Sig. + Sig. - Insig. - Sig. + Insig. + Sig. 
1226 + Sig. + Insig. - Insig. - Sig. - Insig. - Sig. 
631 - Sig. - Sig. + Sig. + Insig. - Insig. + Sig. 
913 - Insig. - Sig. + Sig. + Sig. - Insig. + Insig. 
Avera- + insig. + lnsig. + lnsig. + Insig. - lniig + Insig. 
s a ^ ^ p t ^ f ^ f e ^ f e ^ s ^ [ ^ ^ _ g _ : ^ # ^ ^ ^ ^ s w � ^ ^ i ^ ; ^ ^ # ^ 
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Table 21 Adjusted data statistical results in maturity date classification 
Adjust- Spread Spread Spread Spread Turn -~"Turn -~"Turn -~"Turn - Return Return Return Return 
ed over over over over 
Mean Mean Std. Vari- Mean Mean Std. Vari- Mean Mean Std. Vari-
Dev. ance Dev. ance Dev. ance 
Change TTest Change FTest Change TTest Change FTest Change TTest Change FTest 
Tri5 + sig! + siJ - sig! - iHiiJ + i ^ ^ + _ • 
1109 _ lnsig. - lnsig. + Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. + lnsig. 
630 + lnsig. + lnsig. + Sig. + Sig. - lnsig. + Sig. 
424 - lnsig. + lnsig. + Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. + Sig. 
682 + Sig. + Sig. - Sig. - Sig. + lnsig. + Sig. 
1165 - lnsig. _ lnsig. + lnsig. + Sig. _ lnsig. + lnsig. 
1195 - Sig. - Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
725 - lnsig. - lnsig. - lnsig. - Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
1176 + Sig. + lnsig. - lnsig. - Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
515 - Sig. - Sig. + Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. - lnsig. 
548 - lnsig. + Sig. - Sig. - Sig. + lnsig. + lnsig. 
909 - lnsig. - lnsig. + Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. + lnsig. 
427 - lnsig. - Sig. - lnsig. - Sig. _ lnsig. + Sig. 
9 1 5 _ Sig. - Sig. + lnsig. - Sig. + lnsig. _ lnsig. 
702 + Sig. + Sig. - Sig. - Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
591 + lnsig. + Sig. - Sig. _ Sig. - lnsig. - 'nsig. 
761 + lnsig. + Sig. + lnsig. - lnsig. - lnsig. + Sig. 
678 + lnsig. + lnsig. - lnsig. - lnsig. - lnsig. - lnsig. 
1225 - lnsig. - lnsig. - lnsig. - Sig. + lnsig. + Sig. 
1226 + lnsig. - lnsig. - Sig. - Sig. - lnsig. - Sig. 
631 + Sig. + Sig. + Sig. + Sig. - lnsig. + Sig. 
9 1 3 _ Sig. - Sig. + Sig. + Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
， 丨 + _ • + 丨 叫 | +丨-丨9 + 丨 呵 | • 丨 呵 + - g -
^ 
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Table 22 Raw data statistical results in price level classification 
Ri i ^ Spread Spread Spread Spread lTurnov Turnov Turnov Turnov Return Return Return Return 
Data er er er er 
Mean Means Std. Varianc Mean Mean Std. Varianc Mean Mean Std. Varianc 
Dev. e Dev. e Dev e 
Change TTest Change FTest Change TTest Change FTest Change TTest Change FTest 
At the money 
6 3 0 | ~ - [ t ^ - lnsig. “ + Sig! + Sig. • lnsig. + Sig. 
631 _ Sig. - Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. - lnsig. + Sig. 
1165 - lnsig. - lnsig. - lnsig. + lnsig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
In the money 
^57] I sig! I Sig. ~ + lnsig. + lnsig. - lnsig. + Sig. 
515 _ Sig. - Sig. + Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. - lnsig. 
548 + Sig. + Sig. _ Sig. - Sig. + lnsig. + lnsig. 
591 + lnsig. + Sig. - Sig. - Sig. - lnsig. _ lnsig. 
678 + lnsig. + lnsig. + lnsig. + lnsig. - lnsig. _ lnsig. 
702 + Sig. + Sig. - Sig. - Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
725 + Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. - Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
761 + lnsig. + Sig. + lnsig. + Sig. - lnsig. + Sig. 
909 - lnsig. + lnsig. + Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. + lnsig. 
913 - lnsig. - Sig. + Sig. + Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
915 - lnsig. - lnsig. + Sig. + lnsig. + lnsig. _ lnsig. 
1109 + Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. - Sig. + lnsig. + lnsig. 
1 1 1 5 + Sig. + Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. + lnsig. + lnsig. 
1176 + Sig. + lnsig. + !nsig. - Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
1195 - Sig. - Sig. + Sig. + Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
1225 + Sig. + Sig. - lnsig. - Sig. + lnsig. + Sig. 
1226 + Sig. + lnsig. _ lnsig. - Sig. - lnsig. - Sig. 
Out 
^ ~ I ~ " " s i g ! + lnsig. ~ ~ + Sig! + Sig. ~ + lnsig. + Sig. 
682 - Sig. - Sig. - lnsig. - lnsig. + lnsig. + Sig. 
r 4 ^ - - ' + 嘛 I + _ n s , . + 呵 I - >ns_g. ^ ^ 
r 
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Table 23 Adjusteddata statistical results in price level classification 
Adjust- Spread Spread Spread Spread Turn-~" "Turn-~~Turn- “Turn- Return Return Return Return 
ed over over over over 
Mean Means Std. Vari_ Mean Mean Std. Vari- Mean Mean Std. Vari-
Dev. ance Dev. ance Dev. ance 
Chang TTest Chang FTest Chang TTest Chang FTest Chang TTest Chang FTest 
e e e e e e 
At 
6 3 ^ ~ + lnsig. + lnsig. ~ + s i J + Sig. - lnsig. + Sig. 
631 + Sig. + Sig. + Sig. + Sig. - lnsig. + Sig. 
1165 _ lnsig. - lnsig. + lnsig. + Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
In 
^ ~ I m i i J I s l ^ ~ ' i r ^ - Sig. ~ " i ^ + Sig. 
515 - Sig. - Sig。 + Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. - lnsig. 
548 - lnsig. + Sig。 - Sig. - Sig. + lnsig. + !nsig. 
591 + lnsig. + Sig. - Sig. - Sig. - lnsig. - lnsig. 
678 + lnsig. + lnsig. - lnsig. - lnsig. - lnsig. - lnsig. 
702 + Sig. + Sig. - Sig. - Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
725 - lnsig. - lnsig. - lnsig. - Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
761 + !nsig. + Sig. + lnsig. _ lnsig. - lnsig. + Sig. 
909 - lnsig. - lnsig. + Sig. + Sig. + _ • + _ • 
913 - Sig. - Sig. + Sig. + Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
9 1 5 - Sig. _ Sig. + lnsig. - Sig. + lnsig. - lnsig. 
1109 - lnsig. - lnsig. + Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. + lnsig. 
1 1 1 5 + Sig. + Sig. - Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. + insig. 
1176 + Sig. + lnsig. - lnsig. - Sig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
1 1 9 5 _ Sig. _ Sig. + Sig. + lnsig. - lnsig. + lnsig. 
1225 - lnsig. - lnsig. - lnsig. - Sig. + lnsig. + Sig. 
1226 + lnsig. - lnsig. - Sig. - Sig. - lnsig. - Sig. 
Out 
^ ~ I k ^ + lnsig. ~ " + sig! + Sig. ~ " + lnsig. + Sig. 
682 + Sig. + Sig. - Sig. - Sig. + lnsig. + Sig. 
— g e ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ $ 1 ^ ^ 1 1 ¾ ^ ^ ¾ - ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ^ ¾ ^ 
» 
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